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Abstract
In the wake of the 2005 World Summit ratification of the responsibility to protect 
doctrine, the cases of Darfur and Syria have revealed the decisionary discretion of 
the collective international responsibility to protect inscribed within the doctrine. 
Through an engagement with the decisionist theory of Carl Schmitt and the work 
of  Giorgio  Agamben,  this  essay  seeks  to  return  the  question  of  the  decision 
regarding intervention under the responsibility to protect  doctrine to its  proper 
place as the functioning of power. Through the genealogical method of Michel 
Foucault, the diverse elements of the doctrine could be traced to show the decision 
as the articulation of a certain relation of power. Inscribed within the legal anomie 
where  international  humanitarian  and human rights  law no longer  applies,  the 
doctrine would prescribe a collective international responsibility to protect only in 
relation  to  a  figure of  bare life,  such that  the  fate  of  the latter  would  remain 
subject to the decision of the Security Council. This decision can, as such, always 
take the form of an abstention on action,  sustaining  the legal  anomie wherein 
sovereign power would exist without legal restrictions.
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1 Introduction
We want no more Rwandas, and we believe that the adoption of the proposals in  
our report is the best way of ensuring that. (ICISS 2001 p. VIII)
This had then been the promise of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 which had – from the notion of sovereignty  
as  responsibility which  preceded  it  –  articulated  the  responsibility  to  protect  
doctrine. This was thought to vest the sovereign responsibility for the protection 
of the state's citizens from mass violations of human rights within an international 
system of responsibility, such that when a state would “prove either unwilling or 
unable  to  fulfil  this  duty,  the  responsibility  to  protect  is  transferred  to  the 
international  community.”  (Bellamy  2011  p.  16).  It  would,  the  thinking  was, 
inscribe  a  “permanent  duty  to  protect  individuals  against  abusive  behaviour.” 
(Arbour 2008 p. 448). 
Yet despite these ambitions, and despite the invocations of the inviolability of 
human dignity and inalienable rights which accompanied the doctrine's emergence 
(cf. Bellamy 2009 p. 19; Deng  et al 1996 p. xiii, 4; Annan 1999a p. 6; Annan 
1999d p. 40; ICISS 2001 p. XI, 6; UN 2005 p. 35), the international community's 
inaction in the case of Darfur1 led one commentator to suggest that the doctrine 
had failed its entry exam (see Bellamy 2009 p. 149). And after what was for the 
doctrine  encouraging  results  of  the  international  community's  action  in  Libya 
(Zifcak 2012 p. 67, 71)2, the current situation in Syria led one commentator to 
state:
At the time of writing, incontrovertible evidence has emerged that crimes against  
humanity of a similar scale and intensity to that which preceded the intervention in 
Libya  are  daily  occurring  in  Syria.  Yet  no  internationally  mandated  coercive 
intervention of the Libyan kind seems to be in prospect. (Zifcak 2012 p. 61)
Against the 2005 World Summit's ratification of the doctrine, and against a 
subsequent  UN  resolution  reaffirming  it  (cf.  Bellamy  &  Reike  2011  p.  81; 
1A case which the Human Rights Council's High-Level Mission to Sudan had nevertheless categorized as an 
activation of the international community's responsibility to protect in light of the Sudanese government's 
manifest failure to protect the population there (Bellamy 2009 p. 125f).
2See for instance Security Council resolutions 1970 (UN Security Council 2011a),  1973 (UN Security Council 
2011b).
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Bellamy 2009 p. 2), one was tempted to ask how this possibility could at all have 
remained. How, against the vestment of final responsibility in the international 
community  (Bellamy  2009  p.  55),  could  the  fate  of  the  subject  on  whose 
protection the doctrine was premised, rest on a decision on whether to intervene or 
not? How was it  that this  very international  community,  at  the point at  which 
violations of human rights would reach its most extreme, was left to decide on the 
precarious existence of life devoid of all else but its human rights? 
Yet  despite  the  rather  substantial  discourse  on  the  implementation  of  the 
doctrine (cf.  Bellamy 2011; UN 2009; Luck 2012; Arbour 2008 p.  456f);  and 
despite a critical literature which had sought to scrutinize the relations of power 
inscribed within it (Orford 2011; Cunliffe 2011; Chomsky 2011; Branch 2011; 
Duffield & Waddell 2006; Duffield 2007), these questions it seems have not been 
explicitly asked. 
It is the purpose of this essay to ask, not whether intervention in Darfur or 
Syria should in fact have taken place, but how in the first place the decision on 
whether or not to do so could remain a possibility within the doctrine. In other 
words, to shift the discourse on the doctrine from that of its exceptions to the rule  
itself. 
1.1 The Decision
The decision, understood as the exercise of power, received a politico-juridical 
explication through the works of German legal theorist Carl Schmitt in the early 
1920s. Indeed, the decision received such prominence in Schmitt's thought, that it 
served to define the very nature of sovereign power, expressed through the by 
now famous  statement  opening  his  Political  Theology:  “Sovereign  is  he  who 
decides on the exception.” (Schmitt 2005 p. 5). Deciding on the suspension of the 
legal  order  in  the  state  of  exception,  the  sovereign  –  to  whom  alone  this 
prerogative accrued – would remain irreducible  to any positivist  notion of the 
legal order providing an exhaustive definition of sovereign power (cf. Schmitt 
2005 p. 18ff, 30f;  Orford 2011 p. 129). As we shall  later see, this was not an 
entirely new contention, and may be traced through some of the most important 
writings on Western political theory. 
The intellectual force of Schmitt's notion of the decision as a mark of power 
has it seems unfortunately led a rather peripheral existence within contemporary 
political literature; and with only one notable exception (Orford 2011), appears 
largely absent within the literature on the responsibility to protect. This silence on 
Schmitt's work, perhaps in part due to his association with National Socialism, 
was  however  in  a  sense  interrupted  by  the  work  of  contemporary  Italian 
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philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Entering Schmitt into dialogue with the perhaps 
most innovative thinker on power in modern thought, Michel Foucault, Agamben 
provided new impetus for thinking the decision. 
Departing from this theoretical framework and discussing its relevance for the 
responsibility to protect doctrine, the purpose of this essay is thus to reintroduce 
the problem of the decision into the discussions on the origin of the responsibility 
to protect doctrine. To return the question of the decision on intervention to halt 
mass atrocities inscribed within the doctrine to its proper place as the functioning 
of  power.  From  this  the  initial  research  question  would  be  as  follows:  as  a  
decision  on  intervention  grounded  in  international  humanitarian  and  human  
rights  law,  what  relations  of  power  are  inscribed  within  the  responsibility  to  
protect doctrine such that the decision would remain possible?
1.2 Structure of the Essay
The second chapter of the essay will outline the decisionist theory of Carl Schmitt 
in relation to sovereign power and the state of exception. Through the works of 
Giorgio Agamben, we will expand the theorization of the decision with reference 
to Michel Foucault's writings on power, and outline the theoretical framework for 
the decision within the responsibility to protect. 
The third chapter will present the methodological considerations of the essay 
and  briefly  sketch  the  archaeological  and  genealogical  methods  of  Michel 
Foucault. The chapter will conclude by a description of the method of the essay, 
in  which  elements  of  these  two methods  will  be  employed  and articulated  in 
relation to the general purpose of the study.  
Chapter  four  will  present  the  genealogical  analysis  of  the responsibility  to 
protect. It will be structured according to the diverse genealogical elements of the 
doctrine and outline the decision as a structural relation of power. 
The final chapter will summarize the main findings of the essay and relate 
them to the theoretical framework. A brief discussion and reflections on theory 
and methodology will also be included. 
3
Lund University STVM21
Department of Political Science Autumn 2012
Supervisor: Douglas Brommesson
2 Theory
Both the terms “decision” and “power” have in the preceding been used in a rather 
undefined manner,  and I  shall  in  the following sketch Schmitt's  notion  of  the 
decision  and  its  relation  to  the  distinction  between  power  and  law.  I  shall 
thereafter,  drawing  on  the  work  of  Foucault,  expand  the  notion  of  power,  to 
finally see how Agamben integrates these disparate strands of thought. 
2.1 The Duality of the Sovereign
To understand why Schmitt would attribute such importance to the decision, and 
to clarify in what sense I am here attributing to it the status of power, we shall 
have to clarify in what sense the sovereign power marked out by the decision 
relates  to  the  legally  constituted  power  of  sovereignty.  Let  us  closer  examine 
Schmitt's  decisionist  definition  of  the  sovereign  as  “he  who  decides  on  the 
exception.” (Schmitt 2005 p. 5).  
Schmitt  was  quite  clear  that  the  state  of  exception  inaugurated  by  the 
sovereign decision did not entirely equate a situation characterizable as “anarchy 
or chaos” (Schmitt 2005 p. 12). Rather, within it “the state remains, whereas law 
recedes.” (ibid.). The force of law applies here without its substance and becomes, 
as Agamben denoted it,  force-of-law (Agamben 2005 p. 39).  In this  sense the 
sovereign, in deciding, must necessarily remain in a relation of exteriority vis-à-
vis the  legal  order  which  this  decision  suspends  (Schmitt  2005  p.  7).  This 
undoubtedly constitutes a paradoxical relation, since the sovereign simultaneously 
belongs to and stands outside the normal legal order (Agamben 1998 p. 15). 
As mentioned in the introduction, Schmitt was certainly not the first to remark 
on this paradoxical relation of the sovereign. Indeed, the relation between power 
and law in Hobbes famous Leviathan becomes on closer inspection more complex 
than, and in some sense irreducible to, the question of contractual rights. Hobbes, 
as  Agamben  notes  (1998  p.106),  was  quite  explicit  about  the  fact  that  the 
sovereign's right to punish was not a right given to him by his subjects. This right, 
which has its origins in the right of everyone in the state of nature to use any 
means  for  their  preservation,  “subduing,  hurting,  or  killing  any  man  in  order 
thereunto”  (Hobbes  1996  p.  206),  was  merely  left  with  the  sovereign  by the 
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subjects' laying down of theirs (Hobbes 1996 p. 206; Agamben 1998 p. 106). In 
this sense, the sovereign's paradoxical duality becomes explicit in Hobbes: 
It is important to note that in Hobbes the state of nature survives in the person of 
the  sovereign,  who is  the  only one  to  preserve  its  natural  ius  contra  omnes. 
(Agamben 1998 p. 35)
We may indeed go a bit further and closer consider Machiavelli's recollection 
of the ancient Greek allegory, according to which “ancient princes were sent to 
Chiron  the  Centaur  to  be  raised  and  tutored.”  (Machiavelli  2007  p.  68).  The 
duality of beast and man – corresponding to the opposition between nature and 
society – represents for the prince “two ways of fighting: either with laws or with 
force.” (ibid.). 
What this means is that the ancient princes, whose tutor was half man and half  
beast, learned to use both natures, neither of which can prevail without the other. 
(Machiavelli 2007 p. 68)  
The distinction between force and law inherent in the notion of sovereignty in 
this  sense  has  a  long  history  within  political  thought,  and  in  the  thought  of 
Schmitt, would reveal itself most clearly in the decision on the state of exception 
(cf. Agamben 2005 p. 38f; Schmitt 2005 p. 13). The paradox of sovereignty is that 
while distinct, force and law nevertheless coexists within the sovereign.  The state 
of exception is neither “anarchy or chaos” (Schmitt 2005 p. 12), since the legal 
order is suspended only in order to create the conditions under which it can again 
apply (cf. Agamben 1998 p. 19; Schmitt 2005 p. 13). 
Anne Orford,  who to my knowledge is  the  only one to  explicitly  refer  to 
Schmitt  within  the  literature  on  the  responsibility  to  protect,  had  situated  the 
responsibility to protect doctrine within a tradition of United Nations “executive 
rule” (cf. Orford 2011 p. 103, 106). The decision on protection,  vested by the 
doctrine within the international community rather than with the people of the 
state3 (cf. Orford 2011 p. 138), would subsequently be understood in relation to 
this tradition, underpinned by a protective imperative which would “privilege de 
facto over de jure authority, or fact over right.” (Orford 2011 p. 133, 136).
Yet the paradox of the state of exception is precisely that it “cannot be defined 
either as a situation of fact or as a situation of right”  (Agamben 1998 p.  18). 
Furthermore,  Orford's  account  risks  glossing  over  the  discontinuities  in  the 
discursive constitution of the subject in relation to which power and authority is 
articulated.
In the first volume of his History of Sexuality, Foucault spoke of a “threshold 
of modernity” (Foucault 1990 p. 143), a moment in history where for the first time 
3Similar arguments have been made in regard to the lack of democratic accountability inherent in the doctrine of 
responsibility to protect. Shifting accountability to the international community rather than to the people renders 
the latter deprived of the possibility to hold its state accountable for its actions (cf. Cunliffe 2011 p. 52). 
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the population,  understood not solely as a collection of legal subjects  but as a 
biological phenomenon in its own right, became a political issue (Foucault 2003 
p. 245). At this point, a new subject of power appeared, one whose biological 
existence had to be understood as part of a population and whose fertility,  life 
expectancy,  sickness, etc, became truly political  issues, but did so “only at the 
mass level.” (Foucault 2003 p. 246; cf. 243f; cf. Foucault 1990 p. 142ff, 139). 
Situating  the  emergence  of  what  Foucault  called  biopolitics historically, 
introduces  a  discontinuity  which  becomes  difficult  to  square  with  Orford's 
account. As we shall see, the decision cannot be understood solely as the question 
of who has the authority to decide (cf. Orford 2011 p. 137f). The complex relation 
of right and fact marked out by the sovereign decision becomes fully understood 
only by invoking the field of discourse and power wherein the subject  of life 
against which sovereign power is exercised becomes articulated.  
2.2 Bare Life
There is a limit-figure of life, a threshold in which life is both inside and outside 
the juridical order, and this threshold is the place of sovereignty. (Agamben 1998 
p. 27)
In what sense does Agamben use the term “life” here? Most likely, it serves to 
distinguish it from the legal subject corresponding to the power of the law. Yet 
whereas this might immediately seem to connote Foucault's notion of biopolitics, 
Agamben explicitly posits this limit-figure of life at “the place of sovereignty” 
(Agamben 1998 p. 27). Foucault had remained careful to distinguish sovereign 
power from that of biopolitics, as the logic according to which they operated was 
– despite their  superficial  similarities – quite different (Foucault  2003 p. 239f, 
247).  Agamben instead  directs  his  inquiry precisely into “this  hidden point  of 
intersection  between  the  juridico-institutional  and  the  biopolitical  models  of 
power.” (Agamben 1998 p. 6). As the place of sovereignty here refers back to the 
paradoxical nature of the sovereign, so the notion of life both inside and outside 
the judicial order should absolutely be taken at its word. The limit-figure of life 
which finds itself in this place of sovereignty then refers neither to biological life, 
nor to the criminal or the enemy (the sovereign's prerogative it is to identify, and 
possibly kill (Schmitt 2007 p. 48)). It occupies rather the sphere of “the sovereign 
decision, which suspends law in the state of exception and thus implicates bare 
life within it.” (Agamben 1998 p. 83). 
There is then a paradoxical  figure of  bare life implicated by the sovereign 
decision, devoid of everything except its relation to a sovereign power. It as such 
refers to a subject position which individuals,  themselves interchangeable, may 
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occupy in relation to the power marked out by the sovereign decision. It refers to 
no group in society, no form of life thought of as more elementary than others; it  
marks out only a process of subjectification by which life may be captured by an 
indeterminate  sovereign  power.  Agamben  provides  the  perhaps  most  startling 
example  of  this  process  of  subjectification  in  his  explication  of  the  Nazi 
concentration camps. As he explains, once the Jews had been denationalized and 
entered the “permanent spatial arrangement” (Agamben 1998 p. 169) of the state 
of exception which the camps after all represented, the power of the sovereign 
decision over life and death knew no bounds (cf.  Agamben 1998 p. 170f). To 
reiterate and perhaps clarify a point made earlier, it is this process which remains 
a blind-spot in Orford's argument. More importantly, this process, one should be 
clear,  did  not  disappear  with  the  concentration  camps.  The  individuals  who 
entered  Guantanamo did so precisely because  they were neither  criminals nor 
prisoners of war, but because they had come to assume that indeterminate status 
of “detainees” (Agamben 2005 p. 3f).  
Such may be the most extreme cases of these processes of subjectification. Yet 
the logic itself is far too ubiquitous to be easily dismissed. The apparently benign 
figure of the refugee should for the purposes of this essay assume a position of 
particular  importance.  It  is  again  imperative  to  understand  that  the  refugee 
represents not a natural phenomenon which occasionally emerges to disrupt the 
normal order of the relation between citizen and nation-state. Also here a process 
of subjectification is at work. Devoid of political status, this figure nevertheless 
enters into a relation with the sovereign power of the receiving state. If the state of 
exception  could  be  characterized  as  a  sphere  of  state  without  law,  we should 
certainly see in the refugee a mirror-image of this  power relation.  What is  so 
unsettling about the decisionist power to which the refugee is exposed is however 
not its murderousness, but rather that within those spaces within which it exists 
unperturbed (as in those contemporary equivalents to the camp which Agamben 
identifies in the zones d'attente in French airports4 (Agamben 1998 p. 174)), the 
question of “whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on 
the  civility  and ethical  sense  of  the  police  who temporarily  act  as  sovereign” 
(Agamben 1998 p. 174). 
It  may certainly  be objected  that  the refugee  does  not  constitute  a  subject 
devoid of political status, that this figure on the contrary would represent, in being 
devoid of all other rights, the paradigmatic bearer of human rights (cf. Agamben 
1995 p. 116). Given the importance attributed to the notion of human rights within 
the discourse on the responsibility to protect, it will however be important to here 
carefully outline what subject position is actually articulated by it. 
Let us turn first to Alex J. Bellamy's  arguably authoritative account on the 
history  of  the  responsibility  to  protect.  Recounting  Kofi  Annan's  early 
4These are spaces where “foreigners asking for refugee status are detained” (Agamben 1998 p. 174). 
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formulations of sovereignty as responsibility, he notes that this re-articulation of 
the  relation  between  sovereignty  and  responsibility  implied  legitimacy  to  be 
attributable only to those states  that  “protected the fundamental  rights of their 
citizens”  (Bellamy  2011  p.  10,  my  emphasis).  Yet,  the  foundation  for  this 
redefinition  of  sovereignty  he  attributes  to  “the  inalienable human rights  of 
individuals.”  (Bellamy  2011  p.  10,  italics  in  original).  Unperturbed  by  the 
terminological slippage within his own account, Bellamy essentially reiterates a 
fiction which, according to Agamben, has its origins in the 1789 Declarations of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen5. The operative fiction here is that man and citizen 
are essentially the same, and that man as the supposed bearer of human rights is 
never revealed as such:
Rights are attributed to man (or originate in him) solely to the extent that man is 
the immediately vanishing ground (who must never come to light as such) of the 
citizen. (Agamben 1998 p. 128)
If this fiction had been possible to maintain until the emergence of massive 
refugee  flows  during  the  nineteenth  century  had begun  to  separate  man  from 
citizen, and reveal the necessarily temporary and precarious bearer of nothing but 
human rights (Agamben 1998 p. 126, 131f; Agamben 1995 p. 116), the question 
now is if the responsibility to protect has not brought this fiction to its extreme 
point of tension.
In fact, the Rights of Man represent above all the original figure of the inscription 
of bare natural life in the legal-political order of the nation-state. (Agamben 1995 
p. 116)
Whenever  the  bearer  of  human  rights  reveals  itself  outside  of  any  other 
politico-juridical status, it is thus as bare life, neither fully outside or inside the 
legal order, yet caught by sovereign power. The camp inhabitant – whether in its 
most  paradigmatic  or  more  conspicuous  modern  form in  the  refugee-camps  – 
assumes such a place. As does indeed the detainee who is neither criminal nor 
prisoner of war. 
It is not then enough to ask in relation to the responsibility to protect whether 
there is law. In the absence of a subject of life upon which a political existence 
would be attributable, such law may appear solely as its force. Agamben, in direct 
contrast to Schmitt, stated in words which should for us echo the problematic of 
5It is indeed intriguing to note that Bellamy, whilst quoting Thomas Jefferson, does not remark on the fact that 
even here, the “inalienable Rights” with which every man is endowed, relies upon the creation of 
“Governments” (Jefferson, Thomas quoted in Bellamy 2009 p. 20). While Agamben does not mention 
Jefferson's declaration, his comment on the French Declaration of the Rights of Man from 1789 would certainly 
seem applicable also here: “it is not clear whether the two terms homme and citoyen name two autonomous 
beings or instead form a unitary system in which the first is always already included in the second.” (Agamben 
1998 p. 126f). 
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human rights, that  “[t]he fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not 
that  of  friend/enemy  but  that  of  bare  life/political  existence,  zoē/bios, 
exclusion/inclusion.”  (Agamben  1998  p.  8).  If  the  question  of  inclusion  and 
exclusion, played out at the level of discourse and power, indeed marks out the 
relation of the sovereign decision, we have to ask what is politically at stake in the 
responsibility to protect doctrine's endeavour to “redefine and delimit domestic 
and international jurisdiction” (Orford 2011 p. 178). We have to ask whether these 
delineations  indeed  would  signify  the  inscription  of  a  relation  within  the 
responsibility  to  protect,  such that  the  decision  would  remain  an  ever  present 
possibility. 
2.3 Bare Life, the Decision, and the Responsibility to 
Protect
The question of inclusion and exclusion has since  the publication of Agamben's 
Homo Sacer been extended to the truly international and global practices of the 
contemporary world order. Applying the frameworks of Foucault and Agamben, 
Mark Duffield had situated the doctrines of human security and responsibility to  
protect within  a  redrawing  of  the  “external  sovereign  frontiers”  of  the  West 
(Duffield 2007 p. 80). The responsibility to protect was in this sense envisaged as 
a  strategic  function,  through  which  one  would  be  able  to  control  the  global 
circulation  of  security  risks  associated  with  failed  or  ineffective  states  (cf. 
Duffield & Waddell 2006 p. 10; Duffield 2007 p. 122). Drawing on the work of 
amongst others Duffield, De Larrinaga & Doucet noted in a similar vein:
In rendering life bare and politically unqualified, human security enables a form 
of human subjectivity amenable to the sway of sovereign power exercised from 
the global realm. (De Larrinaga & Doucet 2008 p. 534)
While  these  accounts  may  afford  important  insights  to  the  overarching 
structure  within  which  the  responsibility  to  protect  functions,  particularly  the 
work of Duffield remains eclectic and subsumes under a more or less coherent 
strategic function a considerable array of heterogeneous elements. The concrete 
structure of the decision – with which the present essay is concerned – remains, 
despite these works, a theoretical lacuna. 
This  being  said,  the  work  of  Duffield  extends  Agamben's  theoretical 
framework in important ways. Whereas Agamben himself would sketch only the 
most disturbing outcomes facing those labelled bare life, it has been the work of 
Duffield to introduce the subtlety of the “petty sovereignty” of the humanitarian 
NGOs which may “decide between life to be valued or disallowed.” (Duffield 
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2007 p. 51). Duffield would in this sense extend the question of inclusion and 
exclusion  beyond  the  strict  borders  of  the  state  (Duffield  2007  p.  78f). 
Furthermore, drawing from what had been in Foucault's terms a manifestation of 
the biopolitical form of power (Foucualt 1990 p. 138), the  disallowment of life 
could now be understood as the manifestation  of a relation of sovereign power 
exercisable through the decision (Duffield 2007 p. 51). 
2.4 Conclusion
We are now in a position to return to the question which opened this essay. What 
intrigued me was the inscription of rights and responsibilities as the foundations 
of the doctrine, such that the decision to abstain from their enforcement – and as 
such the decision on the disallowment of life – could remain within it. It would in 
this sense be the inverse of Orford's question regarding  ”the legal limits to the 
actions  that  the international  community might  take in  the name of protecting 
populations at risk.” (Orford 2011 p. 137). To ask instead regarding the limits to 
inaction inherent in the notion of  protection6. 
What I shall propose here, is a re-reading of the  failure of the international 
community to  take  collective  action  “in a  timely  and decisive  manner”  (2005 
World Summit Outcome p. 30), in decisionist terms. To treat the exceptions from 
the principles established within the responsibility to protect, not as mere failings 
or lacunas, but rather as the possibility of a decision. Certainly it may be argued 
that absence of a capacity to act does not constitute a decision, and that a lack of 
political will, for instance within the Security Council, does not equate a decision 
to disallow life in the strictest sense. Yet, while the question on the steps to be 
taken such that  the  doctrine  may be finally  realized  in  its  intended scope and 
fashion remains  open and subject  to  considerable  debate  (cf.  UN 2009;  Luck 
2012; Bellamy 2011), it will be important not to loose sight of what was actually 
inscribed within it. 
To  the  extent  that  we  are  interested  in  the  exceptions  from  what  the 
responsibility  to  protect  prescribes,  it  will  be  in  the  sense  of  thinking  the 
exception, as does Schmitt, in the Kierkegaardian sense: as that which “reveals 
everything more clearly than does the general.” (Kierkegaard quoted in Schmitt 
2005 p. 15). Confining ourselves to thinking the exceptions in terms of failures 
and lacunas will never enable us to think the general which allowed them. 
We shall then have to turn to the doctrine itself. We shall have to describe the 
discourse which allowed it to emerge,  and which articulated a specific subject 
6Carsten Stahn is one of few who raises the question – yet without providing much of an answer to it – of what 
the possibility of inaction implies for the status of RtoP (Stahn 2007 p. 17f). 
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within  the  complex  sphere  of  fact  and  right.  We  shall  have  to  describe  how 
discourses, institutions and laws were taken up, redefined, modified or created in 
relation to it, articulated its delineation, and which would constitute the conditions 
of possibility under which the decision on timely and decisive action in cases of 
manifestly failing states could be made. Should one succeed in such a description, 
one may fill what at the present remains a theoretical lacuna within the academic 
discourse on  the  doctrine.  One may substitute  for  the  decision  as  the  sign  of 
something  always  external  to  the  doctrine,  such  as  the  political  will  of  the 
powerful, the careful description of what made it possible in the first place. 
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3 Method
Already from the preceding discussion, the influence of Foucault on Agamben's 
reformulation of Schmitt was shown to dictate certain methodological directions. 
The decision in this sense would have to be understood as a constitutive relation 
of power, whereby the elements of such a decision – including the subject of life 
caught within it – would have to be described in terms of this relation. 
3.1 The Elements of the Decision
It seems to me firstly that such a description must resolutely avoid treating it as 
the double of some other relation of power – such as those of neocolonialism or 
imperialism (cf. Chomsky 2011; Branch 2011). One would not a priori situate this 
relationship within the field of Realpolitik. Similarly, the notion of the doctrine of 
human  security as  a  global  strategic  functioning  of  power  within  which  the 
responsibility  to  protect  would be situated (cf.  Duffield 2007 p.  114, 119;  De 
Larrinaga & Doucet 2008 p. 534), must similarly be resisted. While many points 
of interaction may exist between the discourse on the responsibility to protect and 
that of human security, what concerns us here is the specific relation established 
by the former. Lastly, while many of the elements of such a relation may antedate 
it,  such  as  the  notion  of  humanitarian  intervention  as  developed  by  Bernard 
Kouchner, human rights, the Security Council and the veto of the Permanent Five, 
it is the unique relation established by the responsibility to protect which is of 
concern here. In these points, one should be clear, no ontological claim is made, 
but rather  a methodological  statement.  We will  concern us here only with the 
unique relation established through the responsibility to protect doctrine between 
a series of diverse elements, and the nature of power inscribed within it.  
Such  an  approach  would  in  this  sense  mirror  the  general  methodological 
project articulated by Michel Foucault in his studies of power (cf. Foucault 2003 
p. 28ff):
[...] rather than starting with the subject (or even subjects) and elements that exist 
prior  to  the  relationship  and  that  can  be  localized,  we  begin  with  the  power 
relationship itself […] and see how the relationship itself determines the elements 
to which it is applied. (Foucault 2003 p. 45)
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Applied to the description of the decision within the responsibility to protect 
doctrine,  one  would  similarly  substitute  for  the  isolated  description  of  the 
elements themselves, in the form in which they might have appeared external to 
all relations of power, the description of the relationship articulated between them. 
One  would  substitute  for  the  notion  of  power  as  something  which  one  may 
possess the description of the conditions according to which power is accorded 
certain elements and denied others (cf. Foucault 2003 p. 13, 30).  
Such a methodological framework however entails a set of practical problems. 
One would have to describe a multiplicity of elements in reference only to the 
relation within which they are articulated. Let us consider first the subject of life 
inscribed within the responsibility to protect doctrine. One would have to describe 
it, not as a being external to the discourse which surrounded it and articulated it in 
relation to the responsibility to protect, but precisely at the level of this discourse. 
One would not substitute for this discursive subject some notion of a pure body 
which remains identical to itself as it enters relations of power (cf. Foucault 1977 
p. 153). Certainly the notion of a subject as bearer of human rights antedates the 
responsibility to protect doctrine, but what interests us here is the specific subject 
articulated by the latter. One is here not merely dealing with a transposition of a 
subject from one field to another. Secondly, one would have to describe how this 
subject  became  articulated  in  relation  to  an  institutional  structure,  and  which 
relations  of  power  were  thereby  prescribed  between  them.  Again,  one  would 
describe not a mere transposition of elements from one field to another. That is, 
whatever powers afforded for instance the Security Council, the aim is to describe 
these as an expression of the relation established by the doctrine. 
These then are the two lines which a description of the decision within the 
responsibility to protect doctrine must follow.
Through an engagement with Foucault's writings on methodology, I will show 
how  Foucault's  earlier  archaeological  method  solved  the  problem  of  the 
description of discourse; how the later Nietzschean genealogical studies offered a 
way of situating discourse within wider relations of power. These methodological 
tools  will  be  shown to  be  capable  of  describing  the  elements  of  the  relation 
inscribed within the possibility of the decision. In the last section of this chapter, I 
shall  articulate  a  cohesive  method  through  which  the  decision  within  the 
responsibility to protect doctrine may be studied through the adoption of these 
tools. I will however begin by providing a brief overview of Foucault's writings 
on methodology.  
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3.2 Foucault's Machinery
Foucault's methodological machinery is often divided into two distinct forms: his 
earlier archaeological method, and his later, Nietzschean genealogy (cf. Howarth 
2000 p. 49). The two works in which Foucault  most explicitly discussed these 
methods were the meticulous  Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) and the short 
essay entitled Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (1977) respectively. 
In the following section, the main tenets of the Archaeology of Knowledge will 
be discussed, and I will try to show how it proposed to solve the problem of the 
study of discourse. The basic machinery of the archaeological method, later to be 
adapted to the description of the subject of the responsibility to protect, will be 
outlined with reference to this work and examples from Foucault's oeuvre. 
Foucault's later genealogical framework will thereafter be briefly outlined. I 
will show how the archaeological machinery became an internal moment within 
its description of relations of power; how it would situate discourse within a wider 
field of elements. I will show how the genealogy proposed to describe relations of 
power as multiplicities of elements articulated within apparatuses (dispositifs) of 
knowledge/power. 
3.2.1 Archaeological Description
The  Archaeology  of  Knowledge,  originally  published  in  1969,  represented  an 
attempt  at  methodologically  describing  the  studies  which  Foucault  in  the 
preceding  years  had  undertaken,  and  which  had  resulted  in  Madness  and 
Civilization (1964)  and  The Order  of  Things (1966)  amongst  others  (Foucault 
1972 p. 14f). 
The problem to which the Archaeology of Knowledge had been a response was 
the relation between discourse and things within historical research. Articulated in 
direct contrast to what Foucualt referred to as histories of the referent (Foucault 
1972 p. 47), the archaeology was envisaged as a method which would avail itself 
from the  pervasive  weight  of  a  referent  either  posited  at  some  pre-discursive 
original experience or at the teleological present (ibid.). In its stead, archaeology 
would posit the rigorous descriptions of the discourses themselves. 
Substituting for the referent as the raison d'etre and stability of discourse – as 
“madness”  to  the  psychiatric  discourse  or  “sexuality”  to  its  repression  –  the 
archaeological description of discursive practices, the conditions of possibility of 
a particular discourse could thereby be described (cf. Foucault 1972 p. 48f). In the 
place of descriptions of referents, archaeological description would direct itself 
towards the practices by which a category of objects come to be taken up within a 
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given discourse and determined to relate to one another; the principles according 
to  which  they  are  classified,  divided,  subsumed  under  one  another  or  some 
common  heading;  the  authorities  who,  through  tradition,  law,  or  privileged 
institutional position, may legitimately make these classifications (Foucault 1972 
p. 41-55). Through such a shift in the approach with which a historical material 
would be studied, one would describe not  things, which discourse may more or 
less accurately represent, but the practices by which discourse itself is produced. 
One would substitute for the history of the referent the rigorous study of “things 
said, precisely as they were said.” (ibid. p. 109). 
This  then becomes,  in part,  the direction  which we must  follow.  We must 
substitute for a referent of the responsibility to protect – be it the eternal subject of 
a  pure  human  being  or  the  transcendental  bearer  of  human  rights  –  the 
archaeological description of the discursive practices by which the discourse of 
the responsibility to protect and the articulation of a subject of life within it could 
be produced.
While  the  archaeology  would  ultimately  prove  restrictive  and  later  be 
replaced, at least in part, by the genealogical method (cf. Howarth 2000 p. 61, 71), 
the functioning of the meticulous machinery it  articulated can be gleaned also 
from Foucault's later studies. We will turn now to closer examine the first volume 
of  Foucault's  History  of  Sexuality.  In  it,  the  archaeological  machinery  can  be 
exemplified, as well as the wider genealogical techniques. 
3.2.2 The History of Sexuality
While Foucault had moved on to his genealogical method by the time he wrote the 
first  volume  of  the  History  of  Sexuality,  many  of  the  salient  features  of  the 
archaeological machinery are effectively highlighted through it. 
The  main  focus  of  the  first  part  of  this  book  was  directed  against  what 
Foucault  referred  to  as  the  “repressive  hypothesis”  (Foucault  1990  p.  10), 
according to  which Victorian  times  had seen  a  concerted  effort  to  repress  all 
discourse on sexuality (ibid. p. 3, 17). While Foucault did admit that “there was a 
policing of statements” (ibid. p. 18), he could simultaneously show that “[a]t the 
level  of  discourses  and  their  domains,  however,  practically  the  opposite 
phenomenon occurred.” (ibid. p. 18). Not that repression would here be contrasted 
with a freedom which the history books had forgotten about (ibid. p. 10f), but 
rather that repression could not be separated from the discourses which produced 
it  (cf.  Foucault  1990  p.  34f).  In  other  words,  that  which  is  repressed  must 
simultaneously be invoked, understood, categorized by a plethora of discursive 
practices; institutions structured to control and amend its deleterious tendencies.
So it  was  through the  scientific  discourse  on  sexuality,  and the  discursive 
practices  of  psychiatry  for  instance,  in  the  nineteenth  century  that  the  act  of 
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sodomy became homosexuality,  and a new subject emerged – later  to demand 
rights within the very discourse which had produced it and sought to control it 
(ibid. p. 43, 101). Indeed, for every mundane manifestation of sexuality deemed 
dangerous or corruptible, a will to know about it and institutional arrangements to 
amend it would correspond (cf. ibid. p. 27ff, 31, 65). In fact, rather than the mere 
deployment of repression, eighteenth century society saw the development of a 
veritable “incitement to talk about sex.” (ibid. p. 23). 
The archaeological machinery substitutes for the analysis of an eternal referent 
of sexuality the study of the discursive practices which produced a certain speech 
regarding it.  Indeed, the sexual subject becomes here not a mere natural thing 
which must  be guided or controlled,  but a product  of discursive practices  and 
relations  of  power.  However,  it  also  becomes  clear  that  Foucault  here  moves 
beyond the mere description of discourse to describe the exercise of power within 
the sphere of sexuality.  The following section will further outline these aspects 
and provide an overview of the genealogical framework within which discourse 
would in Foucault's later works be situated.
3.2.3 Genealogy and the Dispositif
It  was  in  many  ways  to  the  same  methodological  problems  to  which  the 
archaeology had been a response that Foucault would later turn to Nietzsche and 
the genealogical concept of historical research. 
Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (Ursprung), at least on 
those occasions when he is truly a genealogist? First, because it is an attempt to 
capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully 
protected identities, because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms 
that precede the external world of accident and succession.  (Foucault 1977 p. 
142)
Here  however,  the  contrast  was  not  solely  that  between  referents  and 
discourse, and the genealogical method would not be as manifestly linguistic in its 
resistance  to  essences  as  the  archaeology had been (cf.  Howarth  2000 p.  82). 
Against  the  archaeological  description  of  discursive  formations,  Nietzschean 
genealogy would instead suggest an incessant historical tracing in which nothing 
would be stable or essential enough not to be capable of being broken down into a 
multiplicity of origins. A historical method where things were revealed to possess 
“no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien 
forms.” (Foucault 1977 p. 142). 
As  Foucault  developed  his  genealogy,  the  archaeological  machinery  was 
however  not  completely  abandoned.  Rather,  “the  constitution  of  objects  of 
analysis through archaeological  ʻbracketingʼ becomes an internal moment of his 
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overall  genealogical  approach”  (Howarth  2000  p.  67).  However,  whereas  the 
archaeology had focused on the description of discursive practices, the genealogy 
sought  to  expand the  field  by situating  these within  wider  practices  of  power 
(Howarth 2000 p. 72). 
Apart from the short Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, the genealogy was never 
as explicitly articulated as the archaeology in Foucault's writings. However, to the 
adoption of the genealogical framework corresponded a new concept in Foucault's 
later oeuvre, which, for the purposes of this essay, will serve to encapsulate its 
methodological principles: the dispositif7. 
Whereas  Foucault  provided  little  in  the  way  of  a  clear  definition  of  this 
concept,  an  explication  of  it  is  provided  in  a  short  essay  by  Agamben  aptly 
entitled  What Is an Apparatus? (Agamben 2009). Here however, the concept is 
quickly expanded to denote “literally anything that has in some way the capacity 
to  capture,  orient,  determine,  intercept,  model,  control,  or  secure  the  gestures, 
behaviors,  opinions,  or discourses of living beings.”  (ibid.  p.  14).  Despite  this 
rather  voluminous  definition,  Agamben  does  seem  to  arrive  at  the  heart  of 
Foucault's  usage  of  this  term.  The  description  of  dispositifs,  whatever  their 
concrete  form, be it  “prisons,  madhouses,  the  panopticon,  schools,  confession, 
factories,  disciplines,  juridical  measures,  and  so  forth”  (ibid.  p.  14),  is  a 
description that situates discursive practices within relations of power. 
To reconnect with the example from Foucault's History of Sexuality above, the 
discourse on children's sexuality was in Foucault's work shown to be intimately 
related to the architectural layout of the schools which sought to control it (cf. 
Foucault 1990 p. 27f). Similarly,  Foucault's  Discipline and Punish revealed the 
relationship between discourse and architecture within Bentham's panopticism and 
its application within a series of disciplinary institutions (including not only the 
prison, but also the schools, the factory, and the hospital) (Foucault 1991 p. 203). 
The  dispositif then does not  describe merely a  prison,  or  a  school,  or say the 
Security Council, but the multiplicity of elements which, in a given configuration, 
define them. It describes the connections which exists at a given time and place 
between concrete elements, be it discursive practices, architectural forms, laws, 
and so forth (cf. Agamben 2009 p. 2f; Foucault 1980 p. 195). 
The  dispositif furthermore,  becomes  the  site  where  living  beings  are 
subjectified; where, from the substance of the living being in its interaction with 
dispositifs, specific subjects emerge (Agamben 2009 p. 14). From the preceding 
discussion on Foucault's History of Sexuality, it should be absolutely clear that the 
judicial  subject  of  the  sodomite  does  not  equate  the  medical  subject  of  the 
homosexual  (Foucault  1990  p.  43);  between  the  two  a  whole  new  apparatus 
(dispositif) of knowledge/power enters the field of the government of sexuality. 
Similarly, between the petty thief and the criminal corresponds a profound change 
7The English translation “apparatus” is widely used, but appears interchangeably with the original French word 
dispositif. 
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within the penal system, and the notion of the delinquent or the criminal must be 
understood to have emerged within an entire field of discursive practices, laws, 
and even prison architecture (cf. Foucault 1991 p. 272, 277f). To refer back to the 
previous chapter, it was shown that bare life was to be understood not as natural 
or original life but in relation to a sovereign power which may decide over it. 
Lastly, the dispositif corresponds to “an urgent need” (Foucault 1980 p. 195. 
italics in original). That is, it corresponds to some problem or other which appears 
in society, be it certain deleterious sexual practices, madness, delinquency or the 
events in Rwanda or Srebrenica. 
3.2.4 Responsibility to Protect and the Dispositif
Dispositifs then articulate the elements of a relation of power. What I spoke of in 
the beginning of this chapter was in this sense to methodologically consider the 
relation  of  power  inscribed  within  the  possibility  of  the  decision  in  the 
responsibility to protect doctrine as a dispositif of knowledge/power. It would be 
to describe how concrete elements, such as the decision by the Security Council 
on  a  state's  manifest  failure  to  discharge  its  responsibilities,  the  veto  of  the 
Permanent Five, the apparatus of the State, the subject upon whose protection the 
doctrine was premised, were articulated within the unique relation of the decision 
regarding intervention in a sovereign state. One would describe the history of this 
decision as the tracing of a multiplicity of elements, finally to constitute a specific 
relation  of  power  between  an  institutional  framework  and  a  subject  of  life. 
Archaeological description of the discursive practices through which the subject 
of life within the doctrine could be described, becomes here an internal moment of 
the genealogical tracing of elements within which this subject ultimately would be 
situated. 
3.3 The Method
While  the  various  methodological  steps  of  the  description  are  here  treated  as 
relatively distinct forms, it should by now be clear that no aspect can be studied in 
complete isolation from the other. What is presented below as distinct steps, are 
therefore not to be considered in any temporal or logical sense, but merely as a 
simplified schemata. 
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3.3.1 Archaeological Description
The initial step would correspond to the archaeological internal moment of the 
description  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  as  a  dispositif.  If  the  first 
methodological problem here was to deny reference to a figure of pure humanity, 
I shall instead try to describe the subject to which the rights inscribed within the 
responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  was  accrued.  Adapted  from  Foucault's 
archaeological machinery, the following directions will be pursued.
First  will  be  to  describe  the  surfaces where  this  subject  emerged  in  its 
disparate forms (cf. Foucault 1972 p. 41): for instance as victims of genocide, as 
civilians  caught  in  increasingly  savage  civil  wars,  as  victims  of  political 
repression,  as  victims  of  ethnic  cleansing,  as  people  caught  in  the  throes  of 
extreme poverty.  I will try to describe the specific context against which these 
subjects  could emerge  and be presented as  urgent  problems.  This  will  require 
extending  the  analysis  from  the  immediate  documents  of  the  doctrine  to 
contemporary United Nations documents on peace and security, but also to those 
documents which first planted the seeds of the responsibility to protect, such as 
the works of Francis Deng et al (1994), Deng & Cohen (1998) and speeches and 
articles by Kofi Annan from the late 1990s. 
 The  second  discursive  practice  would  be  the  grids  of  specification (cf. 
Foucault 1972 p. 42) according to which these various subjects were separated, 
related,  or  subsumed  under  a  common  heading.  I  shall  try  to  describe  the 
principles  of  reasoning  which  brought  some  under  the  heading  of  the 
responsibility to protect,  while others were not (cf. Chhabra & Zucker 2012 p. 
40). I will similarly describe the codification of these within the framework of the 
four  crimes  of  the  2005  World  Summit  Outcome:  genocide,  crimes  against 
humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (Axworthy 2012 p. 15). 
3.3.2 Description of the Dispositif
From this point I will to some extent depart from the archaeological machinery to 
consider  the  wider  context  of  elements  which  comprise  the  dispositif  of  the 
responsibility to protect. While these will necessarily vary from one dispositif to 
another, it would appear, not least from the preceding discussion, that within the 
context  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  the  legal  framework  assumes 
particular  importance.  The UN Charter,  various international  human rights law 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, 
the Convention on Genocide, the 1948 Geneva Conventions as well as the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court pervade the secondary literature (cf. 
Gierycz 2011 p. 104f, 111; Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 90f). The ICJ judgement in 
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the  case  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  v.  Serbia has  similarly  been  referenced  as 
providing  legal  precedent  to  the  tenets  of  the  doctrine  (Arbour  2008  p.  451; 
Bellamy  &  Reike  2011  p.  97).  As  the  reference  of  these  laws  within  the 
documents  pertaining  to  the  discourse  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  are 
described, what is important  is not the question of whether or not a principle or a 
concept  is  compatible  with  the  immovable  and  unbending  foundations  of 
international  treaties  and  conventions.  Rather,  I  shall  try  to  describe  how 
discourse  attributes  a  certain  status  to  them;  how  their  reference  within  the 
documents  on responsibility to protect,  peace and security,  was used such that 
certain aspects would have to be respected whereas others could be changed. The 
following directions for the analysis will serve as a focal point: the weight of the 
Articles  of  the  UN  Charter  to  the  responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  once  the 
doctrine  was  brought  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations  institutional 
framework; the existence of a certain legal framework such that the doctrine could 
be subsequently codified within the four crimes. 
In  studying  the  institutional  framework  one  would  describe  how  it  was 
envisaged in the early texts by Francis Deng or Kofi Annan. One would further 
describe the wider discourse on conflict, intervention, peace-keeping and peace-
building within the United Nations through the study of contemporary official UN 
speeches and reports regarding the work of the organization.  In studying these 
documents, one would seek to describe how the work of the United Nation was 
envisaged, to what problems it corresponded within the area of security and peace. 
It  will  be  to  describe  within  what  institutional  framework  the  subject  of  the 
responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  entered  as  the  UN  became  this  doctrine's 
embodiment, and what unique relations of power were established thereby. What 
institutions were, by tradition or necessity,  inscribed within the doctrine; which 
could, within limits, be re-imagined. The following directions would be those of 
particular importance: the inscription of the decision regarding a Member State's 
manifest failure to discharge its responsibilities, the decision on intervention, the 
relation thereby inscribed between State and the United Nations institutions, the 
veto of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council originally inscribed 
within the Charter and taken up within the responsibility to protect discourse.  
If one were to succeed in following these steps, I believe one could describe 
the relation between the rules through which a particular subject of life appears, 
and the institutional framework thus afforded the power to decide regarding its 
fate. In short, one would be able to return the decision within the responsibility to 
protect doctrine to its proper place as the functioning of power. 
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3.4 Questions on Material
Foucault's methodological framework provide little in the way of guidance on the 
selection of materials upon which these methods are to be applied. The most one 
can ascertain is that selection is guided more by the relation established between 
statements than by any formal boundaries set by a certain corpus of documents, or 
the supposed coherence provided by the function of the author (cf. Foucault 1972 
p. 95, 97f, 126). 
A more extensive study than the present one might have pursued this issue in 
the  strict  genealogical  manner.  The  time  constraints  together  with  the  sheer 
volume  of  texts  produced  on  the  doctrine  (official,  international,  national, 
academic,  journalistic)  and the intricacy with which they relate to one another, 
however renders such an approach impractical.  In establishing a framework of 
temporal  progression  and  relation  between  the  constitutive  texts  I  thus  relied 
heavily on the secondary literature. This literature was abundant and, particularly 
in the case of Bellamy (2009), impressively meticulous. 
The main texts of the doctrine were the ICISS report from 2001 and the 2005 
World  Summit  Outcome.  Beyond  these,  a  number  of  documents  were 
continuously referenced within the secondary literature, and was thus included. 
These  were  for  instance  A More  Secure  World:  Our  Shared  Responsibility  –  
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change  henceforth 
simply  the  High-Level  Panel,  various  UN  documents  on  peace  and  security, 
including  We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, 
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations henceforth the Brahimi-
report, Prevention of Armed Conflict – Report of the Secretary-General,  and  In  
Larger Freedom: Towards Development,  Security and Human Rights for All  –  
Report  of  the  Secretary-General.  Security  Council  and  General  Assembly 
resolutions  referenced  within  the  secondary  or  primary  literature  or  as 
exemplifications of concrete events were also included.
Within the secondary literature, it has become, it seems, common praxis to 
begin with the works of Francis Deng  et al (1996) and Deng & Cohen (1998) 
(Bellamy 2009 p. 2; Luck 2012 p. 90; Arbour 2008 p. 447; Evans 2008 p. 35f; 
Axworthy 2012 p. 8). Similarly, addresses and speeches by Kofi Annan from the 
late 1990s are frequently referenced as particularly influential (Bellamy 2009 p. 2; 
Thakur 2006 p. 245). These documents here marks, with the exception of Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and  
Peace-Keeping, the temporal beginning of my analysis. 
Certain legal documents referenced within the primary material were however 
also included; most notably the United Nations Charter, 1948 Convention on the  
Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide,  1948  Universal  
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Declaration of Human Rights,  and the  1998 Rome statute of the International  
Criminal  Court.  Others  could  however  not  be  treated  beyond  their  occasional 
appearance within the primary literature due to time constraints. 
While the works of Bellamy and others was heavily relied upon in terms of 
orienting the study within the material,  the methodological underpinnings of this 
essay meant detracting from them in some ways however. What interested me for 
instance  was  not  the  power  struggles  of  the  various  states  and  their 
representatives. While Realpolitik was arguably important in determining the final 
outcome  of  the  doctrine  (cf.  Bellamy  2009),  the  emphasis  on  the  discursive 
development meant that drafts, records of discussions, letters or later accounts by 
involved members of the process were only sparingly used. 
Figure 1 sketches some of the main documents pertaining to the responsibility 
to protect doctrine and their immediate relations. 
Figure 3.1. Timeline and immediate relations of main texts
Sources: Bellamy (2009); Axworthy (2012); Luck (2012); Deng et al (1996)
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4 Analysis
In the  following,  I  will  try  to  trace  the  diverse  threads  that  would eventually 
constitute  the various  elements  of the responsibility  to  protect  doctrine.  While 
most  of  the  documents  discussed  here  directly  or  indirectly  pertain  to  the 
responsibility to protect, the elements traced here does not necessarily follow the 
strict  framework  of  the  doctrine,  but  rather  constitute  the  discursive  and 
institutional field within which it was formulated. Similarly,  while presented as 
analytically distinct, the emphasis here is on the mutually constitutive nature of 
the elements of the decision understood as a dispositif. 
The first section will outline the archaeological description of the subject as it 
entered discourse.  The conditions under which it  could do so and the rules of 
formation  that  would mark  out its  extension  will  be the focus  here.  From the 
theoretical  framework  of  the  essay,  the  description  of  this  discourse  will 
particularly emphasize the relationship between these rules of formation and the 
language of rights. 
In  the  archaeological  description,  and  in  the  subsequent  expansion  of  the 
analysis  to  the  relation  between the  state  and the  subject  of  the  doctrine,  the 
interventionist aspect of the responsibility to protect will be the focus. Here, the 
relation  between  the  subject  and  the  collective  international  responsibility  to 
protect will become the most visible and clearly articulated. 
In  the  following  part,  the  inscription  of  the  collective  international 
responsibility to protect under the auspices of the United Nations will be treated in 
detail, and the weight of the Charter of the United Nations more closely examined 
at the discursive and institutional  level.  I will try to emphasize the continuous 
discursive and institutional relations through which the disparate elements of the 
preceding  description  would  inscribe  the  decision  within  the  United  Nations 
framework, and more specifically, the United Nations Security Council. 
The concluding section will offer some brief comments on the legal status of 
the doctrine. 
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4.1 Archaeological Description of the Subject
Tracing the surfaces of emergence against which the subject first emerged within 
discourse,  and  the  grids  of  specification  according  to  which  it  would  be 
categorized  and  its  extension  articulated,  it  may  be  possible  to  more  clearly 
understand the relation of rights and responsibilities within which it was inscribed. 
4.1.1 Surfaces of Emergence
Let  us  begin  by trying  to  disentangle  some of  the  surfaces  against  which  the 
subject of the responsibility to protect first emerged. It has in this regard been 
noted that the events of the 1990s, which included those in Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia,  constituted  the  immediate  context  against  which  the  question  of 
intervention was taken up with renewed urgency towards the end of the century 
(Arbour 2008 p. 446). Within the speeches and addresses by Kofi Annan from the 
turn of the century, these events would indeed figure prominently, and invoked on 
the subject of humanitarian intervention (Annan 1999a p. 13f; Annan 1999b p. 23; 
Annan 1999d p. 38f; UN 2000a p. 34). Internal conflict had by this time began to 
appear within discourse as novel threat of the post cold war conflict order (UNDP 
1994 p. 47; Deng et al 1996 p. xiii), and Annan would note in 1998 that ”[m]ost 
wars nowadays are civil wars.” (Annan 1999a p. 5).  The ICISS-report, in which 
the term  responsibility  to  protect was  coined,  argued that  ”[t]he  most  marked 
security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation of 
armed conflict within states.” (ICISS 2001 p. 4). In  2004, the High-Level Panel 
provided a comprehensive  account  of what  had during the last  decades  of the 
twentieth century been a growing discrepancy in numbers between civil war and 
inter-state conflict in favour of the former (UN 2004 p. 17). 
In addition to the noted pervasiveness of these conflict within the post cold 
war conflict order, We the Peoples, Annan's 2000 report to the General Assembly, 
had commented on the particularly brutal and pernicious character of the internal 
conflicts of the 1990s (UN 2000a p. 31). In a Security Council resolution from 
1999, it was noted that civilians now constituted “the vast majority of casualties in 
armed conflicts” (UN Security Council 1999 p. 1). 
What had emerged against the post cold war conflict order was thus a new 
subject  of  life:  the  civilian  victim  of   internal  conflict,  ethnic  cleansing,  and 
genocide (cf. UN 2000a p. 6), whose precarious existence was played out behind 
the wall of sovereign inviolability8. The 1990s had thus seen the entry of a new 
8The importance of Francis Deng's appointment as Special Representative on Internally Displaced People by 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the early formulations of sovereignty as responsibility followed a similar logic (cf. 
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problem into United Nations discourse and international security thinking more 
generally9.  One  which  had  brought  to  tension  the  entire  United  Nations 
institutional structure (UN 2000a p. 6).
It was against the entry of these novel set of problems into discourse that Kofi 
Annan famously asked:
[…]  if  humanitarian  intervention  is,  indeed,  an  unacceptable  assault  on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity? (UN 2000a p. 34, emphasis in original) 
The notion of sovereignty as responsibility had been the response by Deng et  
al some years earlier to this question, and had posited that ”[t]he obligation of the 
state to preserve life-sustaining standards for its citizens must be recognized as a 
necessary  condition  of  sovereignty.”  (Deng  et  al  1996  p.  xviii).  Annan's 
redefinition of sovereignty clearly mirrored this contention (Annan 1999d p. 37f; 
Annan 1999e p. 49), and was later taken up as one of the fundamental principles 
of the responsibility to protect by the ICISS (2001 p. 13). According to it, the 
principle of non-intervention inscribed in the Charter would, under serious harm 
to a population which the state proves unable or unwilling to amend, yield to the 
international responsibility to protect (ICISS 2001 p. XI). 
The roots of the responsibility to protect in this are to be found within the 
discourse which had first began to speak of the subject of life revealed by the 
proliferation of internal conflict and mass atrocities.
4.1.2 Grids of Specification
In the early formulations of sovereignty as responsibility by Deng  et al (1996), 
this subject had a rather wide and imprecise extension, and few clear thresholds 
were  established  beyond  which  a  state's  sovereignty  would  be  considered 
forfeited.  Similarly,  Kofi  Annan,  while  contending that  sovereignty would not 
constitute  a  pretext  for non-intervention  in cases of gross violations  of human 
rights (Annan 1999b p. 24), articulated few thresholds beyond which intervention 
would be considered legitimate.  At his  address at  the General Assembly's  54 th 
session in 1999, Annan went so far as to state in relation to the Security Council 
that ”massive and systematic violations of human rights – wherever they may take 
place – should not be allowed to stand.” (Annan 1999d p. 39). Similarly, in  We 
the Peoples, while commenting on the work of the United Nations widely (cf. UN 
Bellamy 2009 p. 21; Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 85). Unlike refugees, Deng & Cohen commented, IDP's would 
not fall under the protection of the United Nations (1998 p. 12f). 
9This had already been remarked on in the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994 p. 47)
25
Lund University STVM21
Department of Political Science Autumn 2012
Supervisor: Douglas Brommesson
2000a p. 15-20), intervention was discussed mainly in relation to “organized mass 
murder and egregious violations of human rights” (UN 2000a p. 34). 
One  of  the  main  features  of  the  ICISS  was  the  establishment  of  clear 
thresholds  for  intervention.  These  would  include:  genocide  (as  defined by the 
1948 Genocide Convention), ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes,  state  collapse  and  resulting  mass  starvation  and  civil  war,  and 
overwhelming natural disasters where the state is unable or unwilling to handle 
the situation (ICISS 2001 p. 33). By the 2005 World Summit Outcome “mass 
starvation, civil war and natural disasters” (Chhabra & Zucker 2012 p. 40) had 
disappeared,  and  we  shall  later  more  closely  look  at  the  legal  framework 
according to which these crimes legally codified this subject.
Most importantly however, the Commission contended that only in cases of 
“large  scale”  loss  of  life  –  a  quantity  deliberately  left  undefined  –  would 
international military intervention be warranted (ICISS 2001 p. 33). 
[…] the  Commission  has  resisted  any  temptation  to  identify  as  a  ground  for  military 
intervention human rights violations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing, for 
example  systematic  racial  discrimination,  or  the  systematic  imprisonment  or  other 
repression of political opponents. (ICISS 2001 p. 34). 
This  however  inscribed  a  subtle  paradox  within  the  doctrine.  In  the  early 
formulations of sovereignty as responsibility by Deng et al, the responsibilities of 
the  international  community  had  been  envisaged  as  rooted  in  the  normative 
standards of human dignity,  articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social,  and Cultural  Rights  (Deng  et  al 
1996  p.  xiii).  Similarly,  the  ICISS  had  envisaged  as  a  foundation  for  the 
responsibility to protect “specific legal obligations under human rights and human 
protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and 
national law” (ICISS 2001 p. XI). Yet whereas the United Nations mission for 
human rights, as Annan claimed, would begin and end with the “individual and 
his or her universal and inalienable rights” (Annan 1999b p. 20),  only as a mass 
phenomenon did the subject of life to be protected by the responsibility to protect 
enter  discourse10.  While  human rights  in  the legal  sense were inscribed in  the 
individual human person, the subject of the responsibility to protect would never 
appear as a singular body, but only as a multiplicity.
This  was  certainly  not  an  imposition  constructed  by the  ICISS.  While  the 
ICISS thresholds were a novel feature within the discourse, they followed almost 
directly from the surfaces of emergence against which the subject of the doctrine 
had first appeared.  Indeed, formulations of ”gross violations of human rights”, 
which  appears  so frequently within the speeches  and addresses through which 
10Chhabra & Zucker (2012 p. 55) and Deller (2012 p. 69) made similar comments on the topic of the legal status 
of the doctrine. These will be treated in more detail under Chapter 4.4
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Annan had raised the question of intervention, appears already in Deng et al (1996 
p. xiii). The origins of the subject of the doctrine must thus be understood to lie in 
the discourse on security and international peace, rather than as a transposition of 
the legal subject of the Declaration of Human Rights. Within the articulation of 
the relation between fact and right of the doctrine, the “rights” of the victim of 
genocide or ethnic cleansing (cf. Bellamy 2009 p. 60), who could appear only as a 
multiplicity, would subsequently be attributable to no person. 
4.2 The Subject and the Institutional Framework
Having now briefly  outlined  the  subject  of  the  doctrine  as  it  emerged  within 
discourse, we now turn to the immediate institutional framework within which 
this subject was inscribed through the doctrine. 
4.2.1 Re-inscribing the State
In An Agenda For Peace from 1992, Boutros-Ghali had famously talked about the 
passing of absolute and exclusive sovereignty (UN 1992 p. 5), a contention taken 
up by Deng et al and the notion of sovereignty as responsibility (Deng et al 1996 
p.  14).  Duffield,  by  contrast,  had  situated  the  responsibility  to  protect  as 
formulated by the ICISS within a general discursive field which had began to re-
emphasize  the  state  in  relation  to  issues  of  security  (Duffield  2007  p.  123). 
Paradoxically,  the  passing  of  absolute  sovereignty,  had  also  opened  up  for  a 
strengthening of the state apparatus (Duffield 2007 p. 121f). 
Indeed,  the  ICISS was quite  clear  in  that  it  considered  it  one  of  its  main 
objectives “to strengthen, not weaken, the sovereignty of states” (ICISS 2001 p. 
75). And while much of the focus of the ICISS-report was on intervention, it is 
important to note that the responsibility to protect doctrine's most basic principle 
was the inscription of state responsibility:
State sovereignty implies  responsibility,  and the primary responsibility for  the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself. (ICISS 2001 p. XI)
This  was  further  reiterated  in  paragraph  138  of  the  2005  World  Summit 
Outcome  (p.  30).  Certainly  this  contention  had  precedent.  Already  in  the 
formulations of sovereignty as responsibility by Deng et al (1996) it was argued 
that ”[u]ntil a replacement is found, the notion of sovereignty must be put to work 
and reaffirmed to meet the challenges of the times in accordance with accepted 
standards of human dignity.” (Deng  et al 1996 p. xi).  Similarly,  within United 
27
Lund University STVM21
Department of Political Science Autumn 2012
Supervisor: Douglas Brommesson
Nations  discourse,  Boutros  Boutros-Ghali  pointed  out  in  his  An  Agenda  For  
Peace from 1992 that the foundation of peace promotion and conflict prevention 
would have to be the State (UN 1992 p. 5). Even as the changing conflict order 
was more explicitly reflected upon within United Nations discourse, Annan had 
stated that nothing would be less desirable than a  world government, and that the 
main impediment to effective governance was the presence of weak states (UN 
2000a p. 7). 
To the importance which the discourse attributed the state certainly a plethora 
of historical reasons may be found; not least the weight of the Charter. Within the 
discursive field which concerns us here however, it is clear that human dignity 
and  rights  would  find  their  embodiment,  and  even  their  prerequisite,  in  the 
institutional  structure  of  the  state  apparatus  (Deng  et  al 1996  p.  19;  Paris 
Roundtable I 2001 p. 2; ICISS 2001 p. 14). As citizens, rather than as bearer of 
human rights, would the subject of the responsibility to protect be guaranteed of 
those “rights beyond borders” (Annan 1999d p. 40) of which Annan had spoken. 
The United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which 
in 2004 took up the ICISS's notion of responsibility to protect, explicitly stated 
that:
What  we  seek  to  protect  reflects  what  we  value.  The  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations seeks to protect  all States,  not because they are intrinsically good but  
because they are necessary to achieve the dignity,  justice,  worth and safety of 
their citizens. (UN 2004 p. 22)
Shortly  thereafter,  Kofi  Annan  expressed  a  similar  sentiment  in  a  United 
Nations report entitled In Larger Freedom, stating that “[i]f States are fragile, the 
peoples of the world will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are 
their right.” (UN 2005 p. 6). 
What  then,  would  be  implied  by  this  notion  of  citizenship?  Let  us  closer 
examine  the  so-called  first  pillar  of  the  responsibility  to  protect,  the  state's 
responsibilities (see UN 2009 p. 8). A quick glance at the discourse through which 
this was formulated, the diverging formulations of how this responsibility was to 
be understood, and to what subject it corresponded, can be quickly gleaned. At 
times this responsibility was to be extended to the  citizens of a state (Deng & 
Cohen 1998 p. 14; UN 2004 p. 56), at others, to the populations within the state's 
care (ICISS 2001 p. XI; 2005 World Summit Outcome p. 30; UN 2005 p. 35)11. 
The distinction is continuously glossed over,  and the citizen and the bearer  of 
human rights here enters a zone of indistinction12 within the biopolitical care of 
11Edward Luck had remarked on this distinction and personally favoured the more extensive 2005 World Summit 
extension of ”population ”(Luck 2012 p. 92). 
12The term ”zone of indistinction” is derived from Agamben and denotes there the indistinction of outside and 
inside in the state of exception (cf. 1998 p. 181)
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the  state13.  No  doubt  could  the  distinction  between  population  and  citizen  be 
rendered superfluous in this way, solely to the extent that the subject of the state 
would here be equated with the bearer of international humanitarian and human 
rights law. It would then be the latter which the doctrine would invoke, if only 
through re-inscribing the state. 
While  intervention,  here  understood as  “action  taken  against  a  state  or  its 
leaders, without its or their consent” (ICISS 2001 p. 8), had been the focus of the 
ICISS-report, prevention of conflict and mass atrocities has been characterized as 
the central tenet of the responsibility to protect (ICISS 2001 p. XI; Thakur 2006 p. 
257)14.  Indeed, much resistance to military intervention was voiced both in the 
final report, which established very high thresholds for intervention, and in the 
roundtables  leading  up  to  the  report  (Paris  Roundtable  II  2001  p.  8;  Geneva 
Roundtable  I  2001  p.  2;  Beijing  Roundtable  2001  p.  1f).  Already  within  the 
formulations of sovereignty as responsibility by Deng et al, and in the speeches by 
Kofi Annan from the late 1990s, had prevention been emphasized (Annan 1999a 
p.  8;  Annan  1999d  p.  41;  Deng  et  al  1996  p.  26).  Within  United  Nations 
discourse, the emphasis on prevention within the promotion of peace and security 
can be gleaned already from Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda For Peace from 
1992 (UN 1992 p. 6f), and remains continuously emphasized (UNDP 1994 p. 38; 
UN 2000b p. 2, 5; UN 2000a p. 31). In 2001, Kofi Annan issued a report entitled 
Prevention of Armed Conflict (UN 2001), which was subsequently taken up in 
Security Council resolution 1366 from 2001 (UN Security Council 2001 p. 1). In 
it,  the Council  stressed “that the essential  responsibility for conflict  prevention 
rests with national Governments, and that the United Nations and the international 
community can play an important role in support of national efforts for conflict 
prevention and can assist in building national capacity in this field” (UN Security 
Council 2001 p. 3). 
No  doubt  could  conflict  prevention  receive  the  widespread  support  it  did 
within the discourse through its  emphasis  on the state  apparatus.  Furthermore, 
conflict prevention, to a higher degree than intervention proper, could find support 
in the United Nations Charter (UN 2001 p. 9). However, while it was hoped that 
the re-inscription of the state and the global apparatuses of conflict  prevention 
would obviate entirely the need for the decision on intervention (ICISS 2001 p. 
19), and the subject of the responsibility to protect to subsequently remain hidden 
behind the citizen, the inscription of sovereign accountability to the international 
13The biopolitical character of the doctrine's re-inscription of the state has been noted by both De Larrinaga & 
Doucet (2008 p. 531), Weber (2009 p. 583) and Duffield (2007 p. 121f). Cunliffe further noted that the 
responsibility to protect would inscribe state responsibility ”for their people rather than to their people.” (2011 p. 
12, emphasis in original). Branch made a similar observation , noting that the responsibility to protect meant 
depriving the people themselves political agency (Branch 2011  p. 109)
14It has been argued that the 2005 World Summit Outcome represented a shift towards prevention from the 
ICISS, which arguably focused more on military intervention (Bellamy 2009 p. 4; Chandler 2011 p. 25f)
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community necessarily meant that this subject would emerge at those times when 
the state would be as dissolved. 
4.2.2 As Were the State Dissolved
As Agamben noted, the state of nature in Hobbes was considered in some sense 
internal to the state, revealed “at the moment in which the State is considered “as 
if it were dissolved” (ut tanquam dissoluta consideretur [Hobbes, De cive, pp. 79-
80]).” (Agamben 1998 p. 36). As we shall see, this formulation  echoes many of 
the  features  of  the  institutional  framework  within  which  the  subject  of  the 
responsibility to protect was inscribed. 
Within  the  discourse  here  described,  the  state  apparatus  was  not  merely 
envisaged as the embodiment of an abstract and generalized notion of citizenship. 
Indeed,  as  we noted,  within the responsibility  to  protect,  the bearer  of  human 
rights and citizen here enters a zone of indistinction, and the former guaranteed 
only by seamlessly passing over into the latter. Only upon the interruption of this 
process  at  the  mass  level,  would  the  collective  international  responsibility  to 
protect be inscribed. 
[…] the responsibility to protect acknowledges that the primary responsibility in 
this regard rests with the state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable 
or  unwilling  to  fulfill  this  responsibility,  or  is  itself  the  perpetrator,  that  it 
becomes  the responsibility of  the  international  community to  act  in  its  place. 
(ICISS 2001 p. 17, my italics). 
In the early formulations of sovereignty as responsibility by Deng et al (1996), 
it was explicitly argued that during internal conflict, “the affected population falls 
into a void of responsibility usually associated with sovereignty” (Deng et al 1996 
p. 221). Within this void, where “death and suffering are being inflicted on large 
numbers of people, and when the state nominally in charge is unable or unwilling 
to stop it” (Annan 1999e p. 49), intervention would be inscribed. Within such an 
anomie, the subject of the doctrine would appear only temporarily; immediately to 
disappear within the citizen and enter the apparatus of the well-functioning state. 
Duffield had already remarked on the fact  that  the responsibility to protect  as 
formulated by the ICISS would not constitute an apparatus of global citizenship, 
but would entail  only ”a short-term international  substitution  for a failed state 
until a local substitute can take over.” (Duffield 2007 p. 123). Deng et al, on the 
subject of the institution of peace enforcement  by the international  community 
within a failed or collapsed state, explicitly saw the purpose of such actions as “to 
bring about a return to responsible sovereignty.” (Deng et al 1996 p. 194). It was 
here emphasized that the responsibilities of conflict management and governance 
in these cases “may fall for a limited time on external agents.” (Deng et al 1996 p. 
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207,  my  italics).  As  formulated  by  the  ICISS-report,  while  intervention  in 
accordance with the responsibility to protect would suspend the legal order of the 
sovereign state, “the suspension of the exercise of sovereignty is only de facto for 
the period of the intervention and follow-up, and not de jure.” (ICISS 2001 p. 44). 
The subject of life which appears in relation to such measures by the collective 
international responsibility to protect, does so only within a legal anomie where 
the state remains in charge only nominally,  and the rights of man accrue to no 
person15.  
While this relation becomes clear enough in relation to intervention proper, we 
saw that the preventive aspect of the responsibility to protect followed a similar 
logic.  Here  however,  separating  the  disparate  elements  becomes  problematic. 
Prevention, within the responsibility to protect and within the wider discursive 
field,  had been articulated  in  relation  to  the  deep structural  causes  of  conflict 
(Annan 1999d p. 50f, 54; UN 1992 p. 6f; UN 2000a p. 31; UN Security Council  
1999 p. 1; ICISS 2001 p. 21ff; UN Security Council 2001 p. 5; UN 2001 p. 7). As 
such, distinguishing between what would fall  under conflict  prevention proper, 
and what would fall under the general purview of the United Nations or “good 
governance” (cf. UN 2000 p. 15) in general becomes problematic.  In the 2005 
World  Summit  Outcome,  it  was  explicitly  stated  that  “development,  peace, 
security  and  human  rights  are  mutually  reinforcing”  (2005  World  Summit 
Outcome  p.  21).  Indeed,  within  the  discourse  on  prevention,  economic 
development  would  become virtually  inseparable  from the prevention  of  mass 
atrocities  and internal  conflict  (cf.  Annan 1999d p.  52f;  UN 2000a p.  33; UN 
Security Council 1999 p. 1). Similarly, many of the features of the work of the 
United Nations,  including the issue of HIV/AIDS, were explicitly taken up as 
aspects of conflict-prevention (UN 2001 p. 28). In his 2001 report, Prevention of  
Armed Conflict, Annan however stated that:
In  this  regard,  I  would  like  to  draw  a  clear  distinction  between  regular 
development  and  humanitarian  assistance  programmes,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
those implemented as a preventive or peace-building response to problems that 
could lead to the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict, on the other. (UN 
2001 p. 7)
While this distinction becomes hard to make at the level of substance, already 
implied by the concept of conflict prevention is the potentiality of future conflict 
and state dissolution (cf. UN 2000b p. 2). 
15No doubt Cunliffe referred to something similar in situating the responsibility to protect doctrine within what 
Slavoj Zizek had called an ”ideology of victimization” (Cunliffe 2011p. 61).  Similar observations have further 
been put forth by Branch (2011 p. 115). The curious notion of ”rights of victims” (Bellamy 2009 p. 60) which 
Bellamy had talked about, here acquire an additional dimension.  Indeed, the proximity between human rights 
and victimization within this discourse (cf. Annan 1999b p. 19), it seems, must be understood in relation to the 
legal anomie within which the former was inscribed. 
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To refer back to the quote by Hobbes which opened this section, we see that 
whether the preventive or the interventionist aspect of the responsibility to protect 
are discussed, the relationship between state and law is retained. Paradoxically, 
the  international  humanitarian  and  human  rights  law  which  the  state  was 
envisaged to uphold would be invoked precisely at the point at which it would no 
longer apply. While the doctrine was unique in challenging the exclusive coupling 
of state and responsibilities, what was envisaged was not a permanent substitute 
for  the  state,  but  a  temporary  and  de  facto assumption  of  the  responsibilities 
normally associated with the state. The inclusion of life into the doctrine would at 
the outset be premised on its exclusion from the state apparatus and would, as the 
archaeological description showed, as such appear juridically indeterminate. Re-
inscribing  the  principle  of  non-intervention  as  “the  norm  from  which  any 
departure has to be justified.” (ICISS 2001 p. 31), such a justification would take 
on only the form of a decision within the legal indeterminacy of the international 
sphere16. 
4.2.3 The International Community and the Inscription of the United 
Nations 
We shall now extend the analysis to the details of this decision, and a description 
of  the  institutional  bodies  upon  whom it  was  invested.  As  we  shall  see,  the 
inscription of the doctrine under the auspices of the United Nations institutional 
framework would be of particular importance.
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  original  formulation  of  sovereignty  as 
responsibility by Deng et al (1996) was made outside the framework of the United 
Nations. Indeed, it was explicitly requested that the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be held outside the purview of 
the United Nations (Axworthy 2012 p. 11). In this sense, one would pursue two 
convergent  yet  related  lines:  on  the  one  hand  the  discursive  origins  of  the 
responsibility to protect doctrine, and on the other the official  discourse of the 
United Nations. As we shall see however, key to the genealogical analysis is the 
constant interaction of these two lines. 
While Deng  et al did not fully equate the international community with the 
United Nations institutional framework, it was clear that the latter would assume a 
particular  status  (Deng  et  al 1996  p.  xxiii,  92),  and  was  indeed  explicitly 
encouraged to adopt the notion of sovereignty as responsibility (Deng & Cohen 
1998 p. 15). Similarly,  while the ICISS was ultimately hosted by the Canadian 
16Orford in a similar vain seems to situate the decision within the doctrine at the point where civil war demands a 
protective authority vested at the international level (cf. Orford 2011 p. 137).  
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government rather than the United Nations, Lloyd Axworthy, who initiated the 
commission, would later state that:
The ICISS proceeded on the assurances that  the report  of such a commission 
would be given serious acceptance at the highest  levels of the UN. (Axworthy 
2012 p. 11)
This said, neither the ICISS-report envisaged the international community as 
entirely exhausted by the United Nations framework, and the possibility was – 
however tentatively formulated – of unilateral action upon a failure to act by the 
UN (ICISS 2001 p. XIII, 53ff). As noted by Bellamy, the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome in contrast made no mention of coercive measures outside authorization 
by the Security Council (Bellamy 2009 p. 96). 
Before more clearly outlining the United Nations institutional framework in 
relation to the responsibility to protect, it appears important to note the context of 
the United Nations in the post cold war order. In Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda For  
Peace, this event meant the opportunity to realize the Charter in its intended scope 
and fashion (UN 1992 p. 22). This was further reiterated in 2000 by Annan in his 
report We The Peoples (UN 2000a p. 31) and again taken up in the 2001 ICISS-
report (ICISS 2001 p. 7). However, by the 2004 High-Level Panel, this optimism 
was no longer present:
The moment was short-lived. It quickly became apparent that the United Nations 
had exchanged the shackles of the cold war for the straitjacket of Member State 
complacency and great Power indifference. (UN 2004 p. 18)
Acquiring political  will  on the part  of Member  States  would indeed be an 
inherent aspect of the organization (cf. Annan 1999c p. 32). Already in Deng et al 
(1996),  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  United  Nations  lacked  the  resources  for 
effective implementation (Deng  et al 1996 p. 190). In a speech at the Ditchley 
Foundation  in  1998,  Annan similarly  pointed  out  that  while  legality  could  be 
provided by Security Council decision and resolution, the United Nations itself 
would  not  possess  “the capacity  for  directing  large-scale  military  enforcement 
operations.” (Annan 1999a p. 12). 
The post cold war context of internal conflict and mass atrocities introduced 
additional  tension into  the United  Nations  institutional  framework,  and Annan 
commented in  We the Peoples from 2000 that “[w]e have not yet  adapted our 
institutions to this new reality.” (UN 2000a p. 6). 
If the international community were to create a new United Nations tomorrow, its 
make-up would surely be different from the one we have. (UN 2000a p. 52)
Paradoxically,  as  the  doctrine  was  taken  up  by  United  Nations  discourse 
through the High-Level Panel,  In Larger Freedom, and the 2005 World Summit 
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Outcome, many features of the doctrine, it seems, were more closely bound to this 
very institutional  framework.  The structural  weaknesses  of  the United  Nations 
thus became in many respects those of the responsibility to protect. While this, as 
we  shall  see,  was  particularly  the  case  in  regard  to  the  veto  of  the  Security 
Council,  the  inscription  of  the  doctrine  within  an  inter-state  institutional 
framework necessarily would entail  a certain decisionary discretion and severe 
constrictions on implementation. 
The latter, one should be clear, can be fully understood only in relation to a 
discursive structure which had at the outset refrained from inscribing international 
community responsibilities in relation to any legal subject. Indeed, as we shall 
see,  measures  under  the  international  responsibility  to  protect  were  inscribed 
under international peace and security rather than human rights. To more fully 
outline these discursive developments, it  will be necessary to describe how the 
Charter would figure within the discourse of the responsibility to protect. 
4.2.4 The United Nations Charter
The  convergence  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  and  contemporary 
United Nations discourse may in many ways be characterized as the most decisive 
moment of the doctrine. Through it, the Charter would introduce novel tensions 
within the discourse, which we in the following we shall try to trace. 
Already in the speeches on intervention by Kofi Annan from the late 1990s 
was the Charter established as the site of a considerable discursive struggle. In a 
1998 speech at the Ditchley Foundation Kofi Annan noted that “Article 2.7 of the 
Charter  protects  national  sovereignty  even  from  intervention  by  the  United 
Nations itself.” (Annan 1999a p. 4). As strong as this prohibition was however, it 
had  simultaneously  been qualified  by the  possibility  of  enforcement  measures 
under Chapter VII of the Charter in cases of threats to international peace and 
security  (UN 1945 Chapter  I  Article  2.7  p.  3).  As  such,  the  Charter  had  left  
discursive room through which sovereignty as responsibility, and eventually the 
responsibility to protect, could be formulated in relation to it. As the 2004 High-
Level Panel noted however, no provisions had been made in the Charter for the 
United Nations in terms of responding to internal conflict and state collapse (UN 
2004 p. 69). International peace and security had traditionally been understood to 
refer  to  inter-state  conflict,  rather  than  to  internal  conflict  and mass  atrocities 
occurring within the borders of a sovereign state (cf. Annan 1999a p. 5; Deng et  
al 1996 p. 28; UNDP 1994 p. 3, 22). From the outset however, at the discursive 
level  the  direction  favoured  was  extending  the  interpretation  of  “international 
peace and security”, rather than amending or disregarding the Charter (cf. Annan 
1999d p.  40).  Annan took the stand that  “[t]he Charter  is  a  living document” 
(Annan 1999d p. 40), establishing the Charter as the site of a discursive struggle. 
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Subsequently, in 2000, he would state that ”[i]n the wake of these conflicts, a new 
understanding of the concept of security is evolving. (UN 2000a p. 31). Similarly, 
in his Prevention of Armed Conflict from 2001, it was argued that “with the end of 
the  cold  war,  a  new understanding  of  the  concept  of  peace  and  security  has 
emerged.” (UN 2001 p. 9). While the ICISS ultimately situated itself within this 
discourse  (ICISS  2001  p.  50),  much  resistance  existed  and  at  the  Beijing 
roundtable of the ICISS, the sentiment was that humanitarian intervention could 
receive no legal  status from the Charter  (Beijing Roundtable 2001 p. 1f).  The 
issue was expressed succinctly at the London roundtable: “both supporters and 
opponents  of  humanitarian  intervention  make  appeals  to  its  norms.”  (London 
Roundtable 2001 p. 1). 
As has been noted (Thakur 2006 p. 250f), the ICISS was careful to distance its 
usage  of  the  term ”intervention”  from that  of  ”humanitarian”,  so  as  to  avoid 
”militarization of the word” (ICISS 2001 p. 9). Indeed, despite employing a wide 
definition of intervention, military intervention would remain a logical possibility 
within the notion of an international responsibility to protect. While an option of 
last resort, as Annan put it, “in the face of mass murder it is an option that cannot 
be relinquished.” (UN 2000a p. 34). As such, the doctrine became bound to the 
provisions for the use of force under Article 42 Chapter VII of the Charter, and 
would be undermined by Article 2.7 without greatly extending the interpretation 
of “international peace and security”17. 
While  the Charter  would indeed become a living document,  the discursive 
room inherent  within it  was not  without bounds.  While  outright  civil  war and 
genocide might convincingly be argued to constitute threats to international peace 
and security,  the  ICISS exclusion  of  “human  rights  violations  falling  short  of 
outright killing or ethnic cleansing” (ICISS 2001 p. 34) reflected the difficulties in 
extending this concept beyond its initial formation. Within the legal anomie where 
the international humanitarian and human rights law would no longer be upheld 
by  the  state  as  if  dissolved,  intervention  as  a  measure  of  the  international 
responsibility to protect would invoke the former solely as a threat to international 
peace and security.
4.3 The Decision
From the  preceding  description,  it  was  noted  how the  collective  international 
responsibility  to  protect  would  be  inscribed  within  a  legal  anomie,  and 
subsequently  subject  to  a  decision  regarding  the  suspension  of  the  non-
17The related discourse of human security, couched in the language of security rather than human rights, would 
follow a similar logic (see for instance UNDP 1994 p. 57)
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intervention norm. As the doctrine would fall under the auspices of the United 
Nations,  this  collective  responsibility  to  protect  would be inscribed within the 
framework of the Charter,  most  notably intervention  under  Article  42 Chapter 
VII. The decision would in this sense accrue to the institutional framework of the 
United Nations, rather than the international community in any abstract sense. In 
the following, we shall try to outline this framework.
4.3.1 The Security Council
While the decision on the manifest failure of a state remained unqualified within 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (Deller 2012 p. 82), the inscription 
of intervention under Article  42 Chapter VII of the Charter would by contrast 
attribute to such measures a clear deciding body. 
Article  24  of  the  Charter  attributed  to  the  Security  Council  the  ”primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN 1945 
Chapter  V Article  24.1 p.  7).  As already noted,  it  is  perhaps one of the most 
notable and decisive events of the responsibility to protect that it was articulated 
within the area of peace and security rather than human rights. It was in fact with 
explicit reference to Article 24 of the Charter that the Security Council decision 
on military intervention was inscribed within the responsibility to protect doctrine 
through the ICISS (ICISS 2001 p. XI):
There is no better or more appropriate  body than the United Nations Security 
Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. (ICISS 
2001 p. XII). 
Annan  had  noted  in  his  In  Larger  Freedom from  2005  the  increasing 
imbalance within the United Nations institutional structure as regards the Councils 
inscribed within the Charter (UN 2005 p. 41). At the expense of the others, the 
Security  Council  had  since  its  inception,  and  particularly  since  the  cold  war, 
“asserted its authority “(UN 2005 p. 41). Upon Annan's recommendations in this 
report (UN 2005 p. 45), General Assembly resolution 60/251 established in 2006 
the Human Rights Council  to  replace  the Commission  on Human Rights  as a 
subsidiary organization to the General Assembly (UN General Assembly 2006 p. 
2). It did not however possess any of the amount of power which the Security 
Council  enjoyed.  The  unavoidable  contingency  of  intervention  within  the 
responsibility to protect doctrine meant that the coercive means at the disposal of 
the international community would have to be inscribed under the mandate of the 
Security Council afforded it through the Charter, rather than the Human Rights 
Council which possessed no such authorities (UN General Assembly 2006). 
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As mentioned,  Article  2.7 established the principle  of United Nations non-
intervention ”in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any  state”  (UN  1945  Chapter  I  Article  2.7.  p.  3).  It  was  here  however 
simultaneously stated that  “this  principle  shall  not  prejudice the application  of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” (UN 1945 Chapter I Article 2.7. p. 3). 
Article 39 of this Chapter gave the Security Council the authority to decide on 
threats to international peace and security and what actions should subsequently 
be taken (UN 1945 Chapter VII Article 39 p. 9). To this effect, Article 42 would 
authorize the Security Council to decide on military actions by the United Nations 
”to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN 1945 Chapter VII 
Article 42 p. 9). This was then the mandate of the Security Council. 
In a speech at the Ditchley Foundation in 1999, Kofi Annan reflected on the 
ever present possibility of military intervention as a last resort of international 
community  action  in  cases  of  “extreme  violence”  (Annan  1999a  p.  10).  The 
question  then,  at  least  rhetorically  posed,  was  what  body  would  assume  the 
decision regarding such interventions. Referencing the Charter, Annan stated here 
unequivocally that:
I would argue, therefore, that only the Council has the authority to decide that the 
internal  situation  in  any  State  is  so  grave  as  to  justify  forceful  intervention. 
(Annan 1999a p. 11) 
While Article 42 was not yet explicitly discussed in relation to intervention in 
a sovereign state on protective grounds in An Agenda For Peace from 1992 (UN 
1992  p.  12),  We  The  Peoples from  2000  had  more  explicitly  discussed  the 
Security  Council  as  the  representative  of  the  international  community  in  the 
possibility  of  coercive  intervention  in  cases  of  mass  atrocities  and  egregious 
violations of human rights (UN 2000a p. 34). A similar sentiment had already 
been  expressed  by  the  Security  Council  itself  in  resolution  1265  from  1999 
(Bellamy  2009  p.  61f).  The  Council  had  then  expressed  “its  willingness  to 
respond  to  situations  of  armed  conflict  where  civilians  are  being  targeted  or 
humanitarian  assistance  to  civilians  is  being  deliberately  obstructed,  including 
through the  consideration  of  appropriate  measures  at  the Council's  disposal  in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (UN Security Council 1999 p. 
3). 
The ICISS inscription  of the Security Council  as the deciding body of the 
responsibility to protect thus situated itself within a discourse which had already 
extended the interpretation of the Security Council mandate (ICISS 2001 p. 50)18. 
As the responsibility to protect was taken up in the 2004 High-Level Panel, the 
Panel stated that: 
18Indeed, on the subject of human security, the 1994 Human Development Report had already raised the 
possibility of extending the Security Council mandate to include as potential threats to peace ”economic and 
social crises.” (UNDP 1994 p. 84)
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[…] step by step, the Council and the wider international community have come 
to  accept  that,  under  Chapter  VII  and  in  pursuit  of  the  emerging  norm of  a 
collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorize military 
action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the 
situation is a “threat to international peace and security”, not especially difficult 
when breaches of international law are involved. (UN 2004 p. 57)19
And as Annan endorsed the responsibility to protect in his 2005 report entitled 
In Larger Freedom, enforcement action by the international community was again 
inscribed with the Security Council  (UN 2005 p. 33, 35). As the doctrine was 
affirmed by the international community at  the 2005 World Summit  Outcome, 
what had been at least a possible support for action outside the Security Council 
had disappeared (Bellamy 2009 p. 96; Chandler 2011 p. 22f). As Lloyd Axworthy 
would later put it:  “Authority to decide was vested exclusively in the Security 
Council.” (Axworthy 2012 p. 15)
Thus, by this time, the decision on intervention within the responsibility to 
protect doctrine was fully inscribed within the Security Council. 
In  the  first  formulation  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  by  the  ICISS,  the 
decision on military intervention had been circumscribed by the establishment of 
a set of criteria. These included “right authority, just cause, right intention, last  
resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.” (ICISS 2001 p. 32). While 
these were still present in the 2004 High-Level Panel (UN 2004 p. 58), they were 
absent  in  the  2005  World  Summit  Outcome  (Bellamy  2009  p.  96).  Whether 
Bellamy was correct in claiming that little difference would have been made by 
the presence of such criteria (Bellamy 2009 p. 3), it is clear that the 2005 World 
Summit  Outcome  emphasized  the  case-by-case character  of  the  decision  on 
intervention  (2005  World  Summit  Outcome  p.  30).  As  such,  considerable 
decisionary discretion on the part of the Security Council was inscribed in the 
responsibility to protect20. The decision on the temporary and de facto suspension 
of the sovereignty of the “manifestly failing” state, would in this sense remain 
truly exceptional.  In the absence of criteria,  and in the absence of a judicially 
determinate subject, the responsibilities of the international community in relation 
to it would be subject entirely to the discretion of the Security Council.  
19Security Council resolution 1973 which authorized actions under Chapter VII in Libya indeed determined the 
situation there to be a threat to international peace and security (UN Security Council 2011b p. 2f)
20In De Larrinaga & Doucet's account, this meant increased discretion on the part of the Security Council in 
distinguishing between biopolitically effective and ineffective states (De Larrinaga & Doucet 2008 p. 531; see 
also Duffield 2007 p. 122). Whether this contention is accurate, or the lack of criteria rather reflected a 
reluctance on the part of the international community to commit itself to undesired actions may be argued. The 
change of the threshold for intervention from ”unable or unwilling” in the ICISS-report to ”manifest failure” in 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome – a threshold Bellamy described as ”significantly higher” (Bellamy 2009 p. 
90) – would seem to point to the latter. 
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4.3.2 The Veto
This was further reaffirmed by the persistence of the veto power of the Permanent 
Five within the Security Council. 
The question of the veto of the Permanent  Five was,  it  seems,  first  raised 
within  the  discourse  on the  responsibility  to  protect  in  the  ICISS-report.  This 
introduced the notion of a  code-of-conduct which would limit its use in matters 
which would not involve vital state interests of the Permanent Five (ICICC 2001 
p. XIII, 51). However, it was simultaneously stated that:
It  is unrealistic to imagine any amendment of the Charter happening any time 
soon so far as the veto power and its distribution are concerned. (ICISS 2001 p.  
51)
It is conceivable that as the responsibility to protect was taken up by the 2004 
High-Level  Panel,  the  subsequent  entry  of  the  doctrine  into  official  United 
Nations discourse meant an increased reflection on the Charter in this regard. The 
report of the Panel thus stated matter-of-factly that:
The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. […] The Charter 
of  the  United  Nations  provided  the  most  powerful  States  with  permanent 
membership in the Security Council and the veto. (UN 2004 p. 64). 
Subsequently,  as noted by Bellamy,  the High-Level  Panel had removed all 
reference to the  code-of-conduct from the doctrine (Bellamy 2009 p. 75). And 
while the Panel urged the Permanent Five to ”pledge themselves to refrain from 
the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses” (UN 
2004 p.  68),  it  simultaneously acknowledged that  it  saw ”no practical  way of 
changing the existing members’ veto powers.” (UN 2004 p. 68). Similarly, while 
discussing some of the suggestions of reform of the Security Council put forth in 
the High-Level Panel report, In Larger Freedom made no mention of the veto (cf. 
UN 2005 p.  42f).  At  the  2005 World  Summit,  scepticism was  voiced  by the 
Permanent  Five  on  the  subject  of  a  code-of-conduct suggested  by  the  ICISS 
(Bellamy 2009 p. 83), and in the paragraphs pertaining to the Security Council, no 
mention of it was made in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (2005 
World Summit Outcome p. 32). 
As should now be clear, the persistence of the veto power followed directly 
from  the  decision  at  the  discursive  level  to  situate  intervention  under  the 
international responsibility to protect within international peace and security, in 
accordance with Article 42 of the Charter. As such, the decision would remain 
even  more  firmly  embedded  in  Realpolitik and  the  power  structure  inherent 
therein. While Annan, in his 1999 article in the Economist, had urged the Security 
Council to “rise to the challenge” (Annan 1999e p. 50) of intervention in cases of 
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mass atrocities, the decision on whether it would do so was nevertheless left with 
it alone.  
4.4 Legal Status
As the preceding analysis has shown, the decision was indeed inscribed within the 
doctrine.  The question in this  sense becomes what the nature of the collective 
international responsibility to protect was envisaged to be. The 2004 High-Level 
Panel had talked about the responsibility to protect as an: 
[…]  emerging  norm  that  there  is  a  collective  international  responsibility  to 
protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a 
last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing 
or  serious  violations  of  international  humanitarian  law  which  sovereign 
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (UN 2004 p. 57). 
A  frequent  question  within  the  secondary  literature  is  to  what  extent  this 
contention was accurate; whether such intervention really had or would aspire to 
the status of norm within international law (cf. Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 82f; 
Stahn 2007 p. 101; Chhabra & Zucker 2012 p. 40; Orford 2011 p. 23). 
4.4.1 Three Pillars and Jus Cogens
In his 2009 report entitled  Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Ban Ki-
moon  divided  the  doctrine  into  three  pillars.  The  first  pillar  concerned  the 
responsibilities of states towards their populations, the second to the assistance of 
the international community, and the third pillar to timely and decisive response 
in cases where the state had manifestly failed in its sovereign responsibilities (UN 
2009 p. 8f). Following this division, the legal status of the constitutive aspects of 
the doctrine may be more easily ascertained (see Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 88). 
On the subject of the first pillar, Bellamy & Reike stated that:
These responsibilities are deeply embedded in existing international law, much of 
which is considered jus cogens. (Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 83)
While the first  pillar  of the responsibility to protect could subsequently be 
considered  jus  cogens21,  much  of  the  second,  and particularly  the  third  pillar, 
would instead be formulated in a moral language (cf. UN 2001 p. 35; UN 2000a 
p. 34; ICISS 2001 p. 33; Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 83). Indeed, as secondary 
21Refers to a peremptory norm within international law (Legal Information Institute)
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literature has pointed out, while there exists now a legal framework for much of 
the crimes encompassed in the responsibility to protect doctrine, little refers to 
collective state responsibilities (cf. Chhabra & Zucker 2012 p. 54f; Bellamy & 
Reike 2011 p. 83, 87)22. Indeed, as Nicole Deller pointed out, the logic according 
to  which  the  principle  of  responsibility  to  protect  and  that  of  international 
jurisdiction operates was envisaged as quite different (Deller 2012 p. 69). 
The  preceding  description  certainly  mirrors  several  of  these  points. 
Discursively  and  institutionally,  the  direction  favoured  was  to  refrain  from 
predicating the international responsibility to protect on any legal subject. Indeed, 
the temporary suspension of sovereignty in cases of gross violations of human 
rights would remain de facto rather than de jure, and subject to the case-by-case 
decision  of  the  Security  Council.  The  responsibilities  of  the  international 
community would remain inscribed within a zone of indistinction between law 
and morality, or norm and “soft law”, as Stahn denoted it (2007 p. 118). As we 
shall see, the codification of the four crimes by the 2005 World Summit did little 
to alter this state of affairs.
4.4.2 The Four Crimes
As already noted, the 2005 World Summit Outcome restricted the extension of the 
responsibility to protect to the four crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing (2005 World Summit Outcome p. 30). As Ban Ki-
moon  famously  state  in  his  2009  report  Implementing  the  Responsibility  to  
Protect:
The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only 
to the four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as 
HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine 
the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept  beyond recognition or operational 
utility; (UN 2009 p. 8)
While this certainly restricted the extension of the subject of the doctrine, it is 
arguable whether it did in fact impose new grids of specification on it. Whereas 
the adoption of the four crimes by the responsibility to protect doctrine may have 
mirrored those encompassed by the 1998 Rome statute of the ICC (Deller 2012 p. 
69)23,  it  also  clear  that  the  two were  not  coextensive.  As  Chhabra  & Zucker 
pointed out:
22The ICJ judgment on Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia did conclude that Serbia was guilty of not preventing 
atrocities in a neighboring country (Arbour 2008 p. 451). 
23The exception here is ”ethnic cleansing”, which nevertheless to a large extent is assumed under the other three 
crimes of the Rome statute, and according to Deller was added to the responsibility to protect mainly for political 
purposes (Deller 2012 p.69)
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Whereas  state  responsibility  typically  requires  ”systematic”  and  ”widespread” 
human  rights  violations,  individual  criminal  liability  can  arise  from  a  single 
incident. (Chhabra & Zucker 2012 p. 55)
Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome statute wherein the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes are defined (ICC 1998 p. 3-9), are substantially 
wider than anything inscribed within the responsibility to protect discourse (cf. 
Deller  2012  p.  69).  It  is  in  this  sense  questionable  whether  the  2005  World 
Summit  Outcome  fundamentally  redefined  the  subject  of  the  responsibility  to 
protect from its initial discursive formulation. While perhaps situated within the 
same discursive field, the Rome statute and the responsibility to protect doctrine 
would operate under distinct discursive rules of formation. The legal framework 
of  the  former  would  in  this  sense  paradoxically  be  invoked  without  being 
attributable to any clearly defined legal subject. 
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5 Conclusion
The  question  which  opened  this  essay  was  how  the  vestment  of  the  final 
responsibility for the protection of human rights by the responsibility to protect 
doctrine,  nevertheless  meant  that  this  responsibility  –  in  cases  where  mass 
violations of human rights were indeed noted to occur – could remain subject to a 
decision. Through the genealogical tracing of the diverse strands of the doctrine, 
and  through  an  engagement  with  the  theoretical  framework  of  Schmitt  and 
Agamben, an answer to this question may now be articulated. 
5.1 The Decision within the Responsibility to Protect
Through the works of Schmitt and Agamben, the decision as a mark of power was 
theorized as the ever present possibility of the force of law to transcend the legal 
order. In the decision, the force which supports law distinguishes itself from its 
substance, and applies without prescribing anything (cf. Agamben 2005 p. 38f). In 
the words which Schmitt used to denote the state of exception, “the state remains, 
whereas law recedes.” (Schmitt 2005 p. 12). The decision in this sense signifies a 
particular relation of power wherein fact and law becomes indistinguishable. 
Through the adoption of Foucault's archaeological machinery, the subject of 
life upon whom the responsibility to protect doctrine was premised was shown to 
have emerged against the pernicious internal conflicts of the post cold war order. 
A life devoid of those human rights for which the state was thought to find its  
raison d'etre (UN 2005 p.  35)  now revealed  itself  as a  mass  phenomenon.  In 
relation to it, the  responsibility to protect would construct from an assemblage of 
heterogeneous elements the edifice which would capture this life. Within it, the 
threshold between state and international community, right and fact, between de 
jure and  de facto authority,  inclusion and exclusion,  would be articulated,  and 
signify the passage of citizen into the subject of the responsibility protect.
These thresholds, while marking a sphere of legal anomie associated with the 
dissolved state, would not however signify the absolute passage from right to fact. 
As Bellamy & Reike would put it,  the collective international responsibility to 
protect would not be “entirely devoid of legal content.” (Bellamy & Reike 2011 p. 
100).  The  sphere  within  which  the  doctrine  would  inscribe  the  collective 
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international  responsibility  to  protect  would  rather  mirror  that  of  the  state  of 
exception, in the sense in which Agamben understood it. In neither case represents 
such a state one of pure fact, “since it is only created through the suspension of 
the rule.” (Agamben 1998 p. 18). The doctrine would articulate rather a relation of 
true  exception.  The legal  framework  of  international  humanitarian  and human 
rights law would here be inscribed as the normal  legal  order of the state,  and 
invoked  by  the  responsibility  to  protect  precisely  within  the  void  of 
responsibilities where the latter would no longer uphold it.  The “rights” of the 
genocide victim or the victim of ethnic cleansing can here ascribe to no person, 
and life becomes captured by a  dispositif of power where right and fact become 
truly indistinguishable. 
As such, intervention as a measure of the responsibility to protect would here 
remain a de facto rather than a de jure assumption of the responsibilities normally 
associated with the state precisely  in the name of the law which it cannot truly  
uphold and must reinstate through the State.  Eschewing the notion of a world 
government,  such  measures  would  never  be  envisaged  as  anything  beyond  a 
temporary and case-by-case substitute for the state apparatus (cf. Duffield 2007 p. 
123). The inscription of such measures under the mandate of the Security Council 
– for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security – can be 
fully  understood  only  in  relation  to  this  structure.  Through  it  however,  the 
decision would acquire a clear institutional embodiment and remain subject to the 
discretion of the Permanent Five. 
While this description in part mirrors that of Orford's account of the decision, 
the latter may now be understood not merely as a question of authority, but as the 
inscription of a relation of power at the discursive and institutional level. Where 
non-intervention would remain  “the norm from which any departure has to be 
justified” (ICISS 2001 p. 31), and where such a justification would be articulated 
in relation to the rights of an indeterminate multiplicity, only the force of the law 
would  be  inscribed  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  state.  Within  the  zone  of 
indistinction between fact and law within which the responsibility to protect was 
inscribed, life truly becomes bare, and the decision of the Security Council would 
take on only the form of a decision on whether such a state of affairs would be 
sustained.  Where  it  would  be  allowed  to  do  so,  if  only  by  the  veto  of  the 
Permanent  Five,  the  sovereignty  of  whomever  acts  within  it  truly  knows  no 
bounds, and life may be disallowed to the point of death. 
What has been described here would indeed reveal itself in the case of Syria. 
Two draft resolutions by the Security Council from 2011 and 2012 noting that 
gross and systematic human rights violations where currently occurring in Syria 
(UN Security Council 2011c p. 2; UN Security Council 2012a p. 2) were vetoed 
by China and Russia (UN Security Council 2011d; UN Security Council 2012b). 
A further draft resolution from 2012, characterizing the situation as a threat to 
international  peace  and security  (UN Security Council  2012e p.  2),  was again 
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vetoed by China and Russia (UN Security Council 2012f). While resolutions 2042 
and 2043 where subsequently adopted, no mention was made to measures under 
Chapter VII, and only a small number of unarmed military observers would be 
deployed (UN Security Council 2012c; UN Security Council 2012d). 
These events, rather than signifying temporary lacunas of the doctrine, must 
be understood in light of the findings of this essay to signify a general which had 
allowed them. Inscribed within a relation of exception, and in relation to a life as 
bare, the decision would remain an ever open possibility within the doctrine. The 
aspirations  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  would  be  violated  only  by  this 
possibility, inscribed within the very doctrine which had formulated them.
5.2 Discussion
The essay will be conluded by offering some brief reflections on methodology and 
theory in light of the findings presented here. Some yet unresolved questions will 
be presented to which future studies on this issue may provide som answers. 
5.2.1 Reflections on Methodology
The adoption of Foucault's overarching genealogical description of relations of 
power at the outset corresponded to a particular set of methodological problems. 
Through it, the diverse elements of the decision could be described in terms of a 
structural relation rather than as historicist essences. It allowed a description of a 
relation  of  power  not  immediately  transposable  to  those  of  neocolonialism or 
Realpolitik. It allowed a description of examples such as those of Syria and Darfur 
not as signs of something always external to the doctrine, but rather of the internal 
structure which had allowed them. The question of implementation, bound to the 
structural  weaknesses  of  the  Security  Council  or  Member  State  political  will 
within  the  United  Nations,  could  thus  be  supplemented  by an  account  of  the 
conditions  of  possibility  which  nevertheless  allowed  the  inscription  of  these 
elements within the doctrine. Similarly, while the significance of the geographical 
dimensions  of  the  surfaces  of  emergence  through which  the  discourse  on  the 
responsibility  to  protect  emerged  remains  an  important  question  (cf.  Branch 
2011), and a post-colonial theoretical dimension on the genealogical history of the 
doctrine may have extended the present findings, it was possible to describe the 
decision as an unique mechanism of power, irrespective of its place within a wider 
field of power. 
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As was noted in the methodological discussions, the genealogical description 
would not concern itself  a priori with the overarching strategic function of the 
specific relations constituting the decision. Mirroring the foucauldian description 
of  power,  the  aim  was  to  resist  describing  power  in  terms  of  intentions  and 
strategies;  to  describe  instead  the very localized  mechanisms through which it 
functions (cf.  Foucault  2003 p. 28ff).  It could subsequently be shown that the 
relation  of  power  inscribed  within  the  doctrine,  in  contrast  to  the  sweeping 
accounts of Duffield and De Larrinaga & Doucet (cf. Duffield 2007 p. 122; De 
Larrinaga  &  Doucet  2008  p.  531,  534),  were  articulated  through  discursive 
struggle  and  piecemeal  accumulation  of  heterogeneous  elements.  While  the 
accounts of Duffield and others may afford important insights to the general field 
within which the doctrine figures, we saw the functioning of the decisionist power 
inscribed within it to not be merely a manifestation thereof. Whatever degree of 
truth  should  be  attributed  to  the  criticisms  of  neocolonialism  or  imperialism 
within the doctrine, the focus here was on the anonymous form of power inscribed 
within the decision; a form of power perhaps ultimately without design or intent 
on the part of the powerful.
Nevertheless,  it  may  be  necessary,  in  order  to  fully  understand  the 
implications hinted at in this essay, to direct ones attention also to the global order 
within which the doctrine is situated. 
5.2.2 Reflections on Theory
The overarching question within which this essay was situated was that of the 
status of rights within the international sphere. While limited to the scope of the 
decision within the responsibility to protect, the genealogical methodology would 
continuously emphasize the discursive and institutional field within which it was 
inscribed. Whether the doctrine should be considered ultimately to have failed in 
being implemented beyond its discursive articulation thus was not the concern of 
this essay. What was of interest, as stated at the outset, was what conditions of 
possibility would allow it to articulate a certain relation of rights and power. 
While, as was mentioned, theoretically and methodologically, the focus of the 
essay  was  on  the  interventionist  aspect  of  the  doctrine,  a  description  of  the 
intervention itself was excluded. That is to say, what concerned us was not those 
instances where the rights of man would settle on the ground with the presence of 
foreign troops.  In  part,  this  followed from the general  silence  on these  issues 
within the discourse studied, in part, this question was beyond the scope of the 
purpose of this essay.  The question of what relation to legality such a state of 
affairs would represents constitutes a particularly relevant question in light of the 
findings of this essay.  
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The theory of the state of exception from which this essay departed, envisaged 
the decision as the establishment of the order upon which law would apply (cf. 
Agamben 1998 p. 19). The question of the complex relation between the decision 
within the responsibility to protect as described here, and the notion of law within 
the  international  sphere,  in  this  sense  remains.  Whether  the  decision  of  the 
responsibility to protect, inscribed as it was at the outset within the deprivation of 
a form of law which would apply only through the state apparatus, in any sense 
parallels that of the decision on the state of exception as articulated by Schmitt in 
this regard, similarly remains an open question. If such is the case, the question 
becomes  what relation exists  between the decision within the responsibility  to 
protect, and a notion of order at the global or international level. No more does 
this  question  apply  to  the  decision  on  intervention  than  the  decision  on  non-
intervention.  While  many  similarities  exists  between  the  decision  within  the 
responsibility to protect, and the decision on the state of exception as articulated 
by Schmitt and Agamben, as this essay could show, the former would represent 
something quite different in being at the outset inscribed within a veritable state of 
exception yet invoking the legal framework of human rights. 
The notion of rights within the international sphere has, its seems, yet to be 
fully understood. While a partial answer, this essay sought to show the precarious 
lineage of rights beyond borders within which the responsibility to protect was 
ultimately formulated. Morality and ethics, this essay has argued, may in the end 
provide little in the way of an equivalents to rights. Until such a time as a more 
fully  articulated  answer can be given to  these questions,  the notion of human 
rights may risk continuously re-inscribing its own failures.
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6 Executive Summary
From  the  works  of  Francis  Deng  et  al  and  Kofi  Annan,  the  International 
Commission  on  Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty  (ICISS),  hosted  by  the 
Canadian  government  in  2001,  would  take  up  the  redefinition  of  sovereignty 
forwarded  by  these  authors,  and  articulate  from  it  what  would  become  the 
responsibility  to  protect  doctrine.  As  it  would  prescribe,  the  inability  or 
unwillingness of a state to protect its population from mass violations of human 
rights associated with genocide,  ethnic cleansing,  crimes against humanity and 
war crimes, would signify the suspension of the norm of non-intervention, and the 
passing  of  the  responsibilities  normally  associated  with  the  state  to  the 
international community. Through it, so it was thought, human rights would find 
their permanent guarantor, irrespective of the borders of sovereign states. 
As the doctrine was taken up and ratified at the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 
and  subsequently  reaffirmed  by  United  Nations  resolution  1674,  inaction  in 
Darfur  and Syria  would  nevertheless  reveal  a  decisionary  discretion  inscribed 
within  it.  Despite  the  invocations  of  the  inviolability  of  human  dignity  and 
inalienable rights which accompanied the doctrine's emergence, the decision had 
remained and would here be exercised in relation to the rights of life itself. 
Bracketing the question on the doctrine's implementation, the purpose of the 
present essay was to instead return the question on the decision on action by the 
international community to its proper place as the functioning of power. It was to 
query how such a possibility  could have remained,  and what  it  meant  for the 
doctrine that it had done so. To ask, not whether intervention in Darfur or Syria 
should in fact have taken place, but how in the first place the decision on whether 
or not to do so could remain a possibility within the doctrine. Departing from the 
theory  of  the  sovereign  decision  by  Carl  Schmitt,  the  research  question  was 
formulated: as a decision on intervention grounded in international humanitarian  
and  human  rights  law,  what  relations  of  power  are  inscribed  within  the  
responsibility to protect doctrine such that the decision would remain possible?
The decision as a mark of power had received a juridico-political explication 
through Carl Schmitt's famous Political Theology. In it, the decision on the state 
of  exception  would  signify  a  particular  relation  of  power,  here  defined  as 
sovereign. In such a relation, the force which upholds and supports the letter of 
the law separates itself from the latter, if only to bring about the state of affairs 
within  which  it  can  again  apply.  The  decision  in  this  sense,  signifies  an 
indeterminacy of law and non-law, fact and right, de jure and de facto authority. 
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Through the works of Giorgio Agamben, this relation was extended to incorporate 
the processes of subjectification whereby life becomes related to law. Revealing 
the figure of bare life, Agamben could show that in relation to a subject devoid of 
legal-political  status,  such  an  indeterminacy  would  characterize  the  sovereign 
power exercisable over it. 
As  the  responsibility  to  protect  had  revealed  a  decisionary  discretion  in 
relation  to  the  very  form of  life  upon  whose  protection  it  was  premised,  the 
question was what it meant that the decision to abstain from action, such as in the 
cases of Syria  and Darfur,  could remain.  What  original  inscription of life  and 
rights  had constituted  the foundation  of  the doctrine,  such that  this  possibility 
could have remained? In this sense, one would ask not regarding the failures or 
lacunas of the doctrine's implementation, but the original inscription of a relation 
of  power  between  such  a  subject  of  life  and  a  deciding  body,  such  that  this 
decision would remain a possibility, if only through the persistence of Realpolitik 
and the veto of the Security Council Permanent Five. 
Mirroring  the  studies  of  power  undertaken  by  Michel  Foucault,  a 
methodological  framework  was  constructed,  drawing  on  both  Foucault's 
archaeological and genealogical machinery, whereby the relation of the decision 
inscribed  within  the  responsibility  to  protect  doctrine  could  be  described. 
Adopting  the  foucauldian  concept  of  the  apparatus  (dispositif)  of 
knowledge/power,  one  would  describe  the  relation  of  the  decision  as  the 
articulation  of  discursive  and  institutional  elements.  One  would  through  it 
describe a process of subjectification and the articulation of a relation of power 
between a subject of life and the decision on the suspension of the norm of non-
intervention. 
As the archaeological description could show, the subject of the responsibility 
to protect emerged against the discursive surfaces of internal conflicts, which had 
proliferated  in  relation  to  inter-state  conflict  during  the  last  decades  of  the 
twentieth  century.  The grids  of  specification  of  this  discourse categorized  this 
subject  at  the  outset  as  a  mass  phenomenon,  and  the  ICISS establishment  of 
thresholds beyond which the non-intervention norm would be suspended had been 
articulated  exclusively  as  “large  scale”  killing.  Expanding  the  genealogical 
description to the institutional framework of the doctrine, what was first noted 
was the re-inscription of the state. Through the apparatus of the state, international 
humanitarian and human rights law would find its institutional embodiment, and 
only upon the failure of the state to guarantee this legal framework, would the 
collective international responsibility to protect come into play. As the history of 
the doctrine would progress, its institutional make-up would become more closely 
bound to that  of  the United  Nations,  rendering  the latter  and the international 
community virtually synonymous terms. 
The  United  Nations  Charter  would  thus  be  established  as  the  site  of  a 
discursive struggle upon which the institutional articulation of the doctrine would 
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depend.  Inscribing  the  collective  international  responsibility  to  protect  under 
coercive  measures  under  Chapter  VII  of  the  Charter,  the  mandate  of  these 
measures  would  have  to  be  expanded  to  encompass  under  the  umbrella  of 
“international peace and security” internal conflict and mass violations of human 
rights. While the Human Rights Council was established in 2006 to replace the 
Commission  on  Human  Rights,  it  did  not  possess  the  authority  to  authorize 
coercive measures in the protection of human rights in a sovereign state. Such 
measures would instead remain under the mandate of the Security Council. This 
would  become  then  the  deciding  body  of  the  responsibility  to  protect.  As 
ultimately codified by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the decision 
on  intervention  by  the  international  community  would  remain  the  exclusive 
prerogative of the Security Council, and contrary to the suggestions put forth by 
the ICISS,  was to  be made  on a  case-by-case basis,  circumscribed neither  by 
criteria nor restrictions on the veto of the Permanent Five. 
The decision  would  then  indeed  prove to  be  inscribed within  the  doctrine 
itself.  As a response to the emergence of a novel subject of the post cold war 
conflict order, the doctrine would construct from an assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements an edifice envisaged as a layered system of responsibilities. Within it, 
the threshold between state and international community, right and fact, between 
de  jure and  de  facto authority,  would  be  articulated.  These  would  mark  the 
passage of the citizen into the subject of the responsibility to protect, signified by 
the dissolution of the state apparatus and the substance of human rights law. At 
the outset, and following the re-inscription of the state, the relationship between 
the state and law would thus be retained. The responsibility to protect would from 
its  inception  be  inscribed  within  the  legal  anomie  where  international 
humanitarian  and  human  rights  law  would  no  longer  be  upheld  by  the  state 
apparatus.  Indeed,  the  raison d'etre of  the doctrine  would be the ever  present 
possibility of the state faltering in its responsibilities. 
What was envisaged was not however a collective international responsibility 
inscribed entirely in a relation of pure exteriority to law, for  here law would be 
invoked by the doctrine precisely in its deprivation. Only as an exception would 
international humanitarian and human rights law appear, temporarily, outside the 
state, ascribing to a subject who would appear only as a multiplicity the “rights” 
of the victim of genocide or ethnic cleansing. Within such a relation of exception, 
intervention by the international community could take only the form of a de facto 
suspension of the sovereignty of the state, paradoxically doing so precisely in the 
name  of  the  law  which  it  cannot  truly  uphold.  Here,  law  and  fact  become 
indistinguishable,  and life  becomes  bare,  subject  to a decision of the Security 
Council.  While  never  truly  capable  of  upholding  human  rights  beyond  the 
temporary suspension of the sovereignty of the state in question, the decision of 
the Security Council would remain radically indeterminate. At its extreme, if only 
through the veto of the Permanent Five, it may sustain the legal anomie wherein it  
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was inscribed. In these instances, the sovereignty of whoever acts within it truly 
knows no bounds, and the decision may disallow the life upon whose protection 
the doctrine was premised, to the point of death. 
The failures and lacunas in the implementation of the doctrine must thus be 
understood  in  relation  to  the  general  which  had  allowed  them.  This  general, 
furthermore,  must  be  understood  within  the  wider  context  of  rights  beyond 
borders within which the doctrine of the responsibility to protect was formulated. 
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